RAM today is nothing like the early 80's,1987 or the recession we had to have.It is much worse. Even worse than the stagflation of the 70s.
Today is really Unprecedented in my lifetime and I was born in 1946 and first began investing in the sharemarket in the late 60s.
For people living in a number of Asian Countries during the Asian crisis - things were much worse. The IMF & World Bank basicly enforced 'poverty-line or below' conditions on their respective Govts or they'd provide no loans. Mortality rates surged (but never rated a mention in the media, nor IMF nor World Bank). One Asian country (who I forget the name of) showed the IMF et al their middle finger and after 3 quarters of mild downturn powered ahead to have GDP around 15% higher than the rest of the Asian countries 'advised' by IMF & Wordl Bank.
Japan example - The Japanese economy was effectively bankrupted in the 1990s. Residential, commercial, industrial & retail property prices plummeted. That's why Japanese Banks virtually ceased to operate at more than 10-15% of their pre-1991 levels internationally. Japan economically imploded. Look up the book 'Money Politics' to get a good understanding of how Japan really operated.
Most property markets around the world are NOT like Australia. Japan, for example, had a 65% capital gains tax on property sales of any type wheterh a house, unit to 60 storey office building. Keating took advantage of the Japanese Property Bubble to sell (tax-free) the Australian Embassy & tiny plot of land it was on - for around $250m I think it was.
Japanese property prices (across the board) shot up in a vacuum from 1986 to late 1989. In late 1989 Greater Tokyo property was worth more (according to valuations) than the entire Continental US property combined.
This saw many Japanese companies valued as an asset play (their property holdings - many industrial companies had workers dormitories next to their factories, a model adopted in China's modernisation). The Nikkei went from under 8,000 to nearly 40,000 driven mostly by this. Japanese banks lent 30x their equity base to the property development +/or acquisition sectors over this time. October 1987 put a stop to the party in the rest of the world but Japan carried on a little longer.
As property prices plateaued and then started declining (MASSIVE loss of face to sell a property at a loss vs valuation in Japan as Post-1945 it had never happened). So only non-Japanese companies started to sell out - not one Japanese company (see Money Politics again). In fact in an attempt to support the market, the valuations, and the massive exposure of the banks - Japan Inc stepped up to buy probably the first 100 or so major sales, then one ratings agency issued a credit warning...
Japan did not have real estate agents, selling a house to buy a bigger one (or unit) did not happen for 2 reasons - 65% capital gains tax & house' only lasted 25-35yrs before they literally fell down (bamboo glued construction). Propety developers (building highrise) would buy 4 or 5 houses, consolidate the plot & in many cases as part of selling the units off the plan, would buy the falling down houses (& may have got an exemption to the capital gains tax). Sales dried up & they were close to going under. So the Govt launched a nationwide campaign (in 1993 or so) promoting 'buy property for your grandchildren' & introduced legislation to allow 120yr mortgages, that necame known as Grandfather loans. Many families did not own their unit/home they rented and with the Govt saying this was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity - it was estimated that this pulled in nearly 17% of the Japanese population to buy with a 2-3% deposit. Once this surge in demand was past - residential prices started falling again. Wiping out their deposits, & around 40% of private Japanese savings. Then prices fell another 20%...
Suicide rates spiked, as Japan restructured & jobs for life began to disappear - enough lost their jobs to impact on confidence. Yet now the family had a debt much greater than the value of the unit. Extended families drew down on their savings to make the mortgage repayments and the thing snowballed. In nominal terms Japanese residential property prices are at early to mid 1980s levels - up to 75% below where they were bought. Yet Japense Banks were given an exemption by IMF et al - and don't have to write the carrying values in their books as long as the mortgages remain serviced. Loss of face sees the servicing mostly continue but it has seen consumption spending contract,
The Japanese economy has effectively not grown for 30 years, had zero interest rates for approaching 30 years & if interest rates increase by 1% then over 80% of Govt spending would be required to pay the interest on Govt debt. In 1990 Japan was the world's 2nd largest economy. Now that's China.
So, things might be tough in Austraia & some overseas countries but nothing like that faced by those listed above. In Australia's case actually, since we run an annual tourism deficit of $20bn+, with Australians heading offshore spending $65bn or so (from Scomo's announcement) - the closing of borders will see Australian GDP increase! Gotta love economics.
No comfort for Q though.
Q's Shareholder Purchase Plan booklets should be received by email from today and allow a shareholder with just 1 (or more) share(s) to purchase $30,000 worth. Technically Q says they are looking to raise $500m which would be achieved if around 16,700 shareholders bought the full amount. Given the uncertainty who knows, but if more than 16,700 individuals are feeling lucky then Q can raise much more.
Confession - oops...
I heard a radio report that Q had accepted all over-subscriptions by instos and raised $4bn. Turns out that report was wrong (& I mentioned it in an AFF thread). What they shoudl have reported was total bids were close to $4bn. Q could not accept them as the $1.36bn saw the max number of shares allowed to be issued (25% of total outstanding prior to raising).
I'll go stand in the corner now