But what the raw stats don't show is how they dealt with it. What changes were implemented to maintenance procedures/schedules, to pilot/crew training, to operating procedures? In many cases, the end result is a safer airline as a result of the changes implemented, not a less safe airline as a pure historical review of the statistics would imply. For example, it is my understanding that the BKK golfing expedition resulted in some changes to standard operating procedures and crew training aimed at minimising the probability of it happening again. Without the changes being implemented, safety is compomised. But following the changes that were implemented as a direct result of the incident, the probability of it happening again is reduced. Logically this should mean an improved future safety rating, not a reduced one.
Without consideration for how each airline responds to incidents (their own and those experienced by others), any historical safety statistic review is just that - historic. It does not imply likelihood of future issues unless no changes have been implemented as a result of past failings - and I doubt there are many airlines that a guilty of that and if there are any, those are the ones I don't want to fly (ok, a few may come to mind). In my opinion, airlines that bury their heads in the sand and refuse to acknowledge any responsibility for mistakes are the ones that are most likely to have repeat issues. But its all statistics and in the case of the referenced study, I believe there are several factors that have a significant impact on the statistical validity of the results, especially for predicting future results, that appear to have been ignored. Then again, its very hard to find any details about the mechanism used to calculate the safety factor rating in that study.