Air France passenger jet drops off radar

[jb747]

Yes - it was a dark night and they had instrument problems, very difficult to know exactly what was going on...

Given attitude and power data, it's pretty hard to accept an aircraft being crashed as this one was...particularly with aft stick inputs for virtually the entire event.

 

[MatF]

Yes - it was a dark night and they had instrument problems, very difficult to know exactly what was going on...

Digging this thread up again, because I've just noticed a very chilling coughpit voice transcript on AVHerald (has probably been there for a while, but I've just noticed it): Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Jun 1st 2009, aircraft entered high altitude stall and impacted ocean

You'll have to scroll down a bit - it's at the bottom of the most recent post.

 

[Sifor]

Poor buggers didn't even have a clue what was going on...

 

[MatF]

Indeed, it certainly seems that way.

jb747: would be very interested to hear your analysis of what was said. There are some things there I don't understand.

 

[tgh]

jb747: would be very interested to hear your analysis of what was said. There are some things there I don't understand.

+1

 

[QF WP]

+ 2. I still can't believe Air France's attitude. That is going to be some episode of ACI.

 

[jb747]

jb747: would be very interested to hear your analysis of what was said. There are some things there I don't understand.

What comments in particular don't you understand?

Really, I don't understand how they managed it. Their coughpit was a confusing place, but there was plenty of data available to fly the aircraft.

 

[MatF]

What comments in particular don't you understand?

Really, I don't understand how they managed it. Their coughpit was a confusing place, but there was plenty of data available to fly the aircraft.

Well, I don't really understand what most of the acronyms are - SALPU, TASIL (if these are acronyms?), ATHR, ATT. Also, the to and fro between the PF and the PNF seems really odd (perhaps it's the translation). I know there was a lot of confusion, but is that the kind of dialogue you'd expect? There are a couple of times where they are confused about whether they are climbing or descending?

I don't understand what's happening during this section:

02:10:27	PNF	Watch your speed, Watch your speed
	PF	Ok, ok, I will descend back
	PNF	You are stabilizing
	PF	Yeah
	PNF	You are descending back
02:10:33	PNF	According to the three you are climbing, now you are descending.
02:10:35	PF	Agreed
02:10:36	PNF	You are at… descend back
	PF	It is going, we are descending back
02:10:39	PNF	I’ll put you on A T T (*) (Selecteur ATT /HDG is put in position F/O on 3)
02:10:42	PF	We are, yes we are in climb
02:10:49	PNF	Where is he, eh?
02:10:56	PF	TOGA
02:11	PNF	Try to use the lateral controls as few as possible hey!
02:11:03	PF	I am in TOGA
02:11:06	PNF	… is he coming or not
02:11:21	PNF	We have certainly the engines, what is happening?
02:11:32	PF	I don’t have control of the aircraft, I don’t have control of the aircraft at all

Cheers,
Mat.

 

[jb747]

Well, I don't really understand what most of the acronyms are - SALPU, TASIL (if these are acronyms?), ATHR, ATT. Also, the to and fro between the PF and the PNF seems really odd (perhaps it's the translation). I know there was a lot of confusion, but is that the kind of dialogue you'd expect? There are a couple of times where they are confused about whether they are climbing or descending?

I don't understand what's happening during this section:

02:10:27	PNF	Watch your speed, Watch your speed
	PF	Ok, ok, I will descend back
	PNF	You are stabilizing
	PF	Yeah
	PNF	You are descending back
02:10:33	PNF	According to the three you are climbing, now you are descending.
02:10:35	PF	Agreed
02:10:36	PNF	You are at… descend back
	PF	It is going, we are descending back
02:10:39	PNF	I’ll put you on A T T (*) (Selecteur ATT /HDG is put in position F/O on 3)
02:10:42	PF	We are, yes we are in climb
02:10:49	PNF	Where is he, eh?
02:10:56	PF	TOGA
02:11	PNF	Try to use the lateral controls as few as possible hey!
02:11:03	PF	I am in TOGA
02:11:06	PNF	… is he coming or not
02:11:21	PNF	We have certainly the engines, what is happening?
02:11:32	PF	I don’t have control of the aircraft, I don’t have control of the aircraft at all

SALPU and TASIL are waypoints.

ATHR = autothrust
ATT = attitude
TOGA = take off go around power...basically the firewall

ATT /HDG is put in position "F/O on 3"....There are three switches which control what data source is being used by each pilot. For instance, there are 3 air data computers...normally the captain is on 1, and the FO on 2, with 3 available as a spare. In this case it looks like the FO attitude display has been selected to 3. Implication of this is that they don't believe the attitude being shown to the PF...but, there is no apparent cross check of the data from the PNF display or the backup, to ensure that they aren't changing away from real data, or onto bad. In any event, there is no reason the believe that any of the attitude data being shown was wrong. It almost sounds as if they don't believe the attitude data, and so try to fly on the performance data (which is totally incorrect).

There is a fair bit of gibberish in the comments on the forum from which this data has been taken.

Upshot, as I see, it. There was no reason whatsoever to select the sort of pitch attitude that they did. The aircraft cannot go anywhere near 10 degrees nose up at altitude, and even the 5 that some seem to think would be ok would stall you in short order (at an altitude near their performance max). Holding the current pitch attitude (about 2-2.5 degrees), and leaving the power where it was, would result in the aircraft basically doing nothing. The unreliable airspeed checklists contain a couple of attitudes, but they a mostly meant for use at low level (i.e. just after take off). If the aircraft is stable, it will stay that way, unless you change something.

There seems to be no recognition of the fact that being in alternate law means that full aft stick is a total no no. They never seem to understand the implications of loss of speed...i.e. stalling. Nose up in the air, whilst descending at a huge rate is fairly classic stall behaviour (if you hold full aft stick).

Holding the stick aft for any length of time will cause the aircraft to trim nose up (which it did). TOGA will also pitch it nose up. Both can be overcome by forward stick input, but it's not a small input, and it needs to be held.

I would be curious to know what training the PNF had in flying from the left seat. He was quite a bit more experienced than the PF, but was operating from what would be the 'wrong' seat for him. Did his sim exercises ever have him doing anything from that side...or, as he was an FO, were they all from the right seat, with a Captain in the left? Were any of the other crew ever aware of backstick being put in by the PF? The controls are not interlinked, so there is no way to tell. I just get the feeling that the two non flying (captain and PNF) never realised that what they were seeing was all a result of intentional control inputs.

 

[QF WP]

Thanks jb747. I understand a little more now. Seems they (PF and PNF) did a lot wrong and I can't understand why, if the Captain returned to the coughpit, he didn't seem to take over...

 

[tgh]

All terribly sad, can it , will it ever happen again ?
As someone who was taught stall characteristics at 16, I held a private view that the outcome would be about what it is.
Doesn't make me feel any better for all that...

 

[jb747]

...I can't understand why, if the Captain returned to the coughpit, he didn't seem to take over...

The fact that he managed to get back into the coughpit doesn't mean that it would have been possible to get into his seat. The view from the middle often gives the best overview of what is happening. Working out what is happening takes a bit of time, and it also takes complete knowledge of what is being done. I'm not convinced that the aft stick inputs would have been apparent to somebody who has just arrived on the scene.

 

[casanovawa]

Between this and the ACI episode where the plane was flying down the valley into Cali i think and the wrong waystation or whatever was put in the computer and they ended up flying into a mountain in the dark and a recent ACI episode (on foxtel) where the captain of an Egyptian airline (forget exact name) seem to fly his plane into the ocean after losing spatial awareness or whatever, it seems basic, but night flying has all the dangers of day flying plus the fact that it can be so damn hard for the pilots to figure out what is around them and what they are doing/where they are going...

I guess for long flights of 7-8 or so hours and up, specially flying east-west or vv, its gonna be almost impossible to avoid some night time flying, but day time flying does seem slightly preferable... One less negative variable taken out of the equation and seems safer not that i have ever really considered this when booking a trip... I guess there is also more air traffic during the day to add another complexity than at night, but wonder what the stats would be on level of safety at night compared to day time flying and whether it would be statistically significant?

 

[jb747]

All terribly sad, can it , will it ever happen again ?

Well, I believe that we will see many more examples of this sort of thing in coming years. We're arriving at a point in aviation history in which the people who run the airlines have decided that they would prefer to have 200 hour cadets in aircraft, rather than people with experience in the real world (i.e. GA and air force)...not because they are better, but because they are cheap. Helping to drive this along is (mostly) Airbus, who have been telling these same managers that their aircraft are so safe, that they don't need real pilots.

Sadly, they are telling a couple of porkies. Their aircraft are every bit as subject to failures as previous aircraft. Minor failures can be handled quite easily, and generally with minimal system knowledge, simply by following the instructions. But, as soon as the failures require a deeper understanding of the systems, and their interactions, the wondrous ECAM itself loses the plot (who'd have thought that more than one problem at a time was possible). The base concept has been to write a procedure for everything (and then expect this vast number of things to be remembered). They have merrily removed most of the feedback and clues that pilots have used for years, generally (but not always) replacing them with numbers, hidden away, somewhere on the displays (no interconnection between joysticks, thrust levers that don't move with power changes, and which can even give non intuitive thrust changes). Ergonomically, the placement of identical switches, with dangerous, and totally different outcomes, within inches of each other (presumably because it looks tidy).

But, the biggest issue is that the aircraft, will revert to lower grades of flight control capability fairly easily. When they do so, they pretty much invariably remove the autopilot, flight directors, and auto thrust. So, we take pilots who've been chosen for good memory, but not flying ability, put them in an aircraft which is mostly easy to fly, and then take away all of their automatics, and simultaneously make the aircraft much more difficult to fly.

 

[jb747]

.... but wonder what the stats would be on level of safety at night compared to day time flying and whether it would be statistically significant?

Don't forget that you'll also need to fly when there are no clouds. No rain. Preferably no wind too. Or dust. Smoke. Birds. Also best to go on flights that aren't going to have any mechanical failures.

 

[casanovawa]

Thank you for that considered response JB, i was going to put in something about aircraft simply breaking but i then found it hard to think how something breaking on a plane at night could still be any safer than a breakage during the day... The Gimly Glider etc, I'm wondering how that could have been much more of an enjoyable experience in the black of night???

So you don't think being able to see the ground or the mountains could at all be any better in an emergency situation? While artificial horizons and all are available (if systems are working properly) i can't help thinking i would prefer one rather than the other if i was at the controls and fecal matter started flying... But just silly me i suppose...

Anyway, like i said, i was just wondering if there had ever been any statitical analysis done, both situations might still be streets ahead of the drive to the airport, but i think i have heard people say the only dumb question was the one you don't ask???

Edit: Also, when you book a week or 6 months in advance, you have little control over what the weather may be on the day, but you can certianly choose the time... And no i'm not a particular stress head, as i said i've never really thought about it and price will probably be the decisive factor in the future, but it sort of occurred to me...

Edit Edit: I also didn't mean to take it so far off topic by rehashing the whole ACI series... It was just a question about night time flying...

 

[eastwest101]

Well, I believe that we will see many more examples of this sort of thing in coming years. We're arriving at a point in aviation history in which the people who run the airlines have decided that they would prefer to have 200 hour cadets in aircraft, rather than people with experience in the real world (i.e. GA and air force)...not because they are better, but because they are cheap. Helping to drive this along is (mostly) Airbus, who have been telling these same managers that their aircraft are so safe, that they don't need real pilots.

Sadly, they are telling a couple of porkies. Their aircraft are every bit as subject to failures as previous aircraft. Minor failures can be handled quite easily, and generally with minimal system knowledge, simply by following the instructions. But, as soon as the failures require a deeper understanding of the systems, and their interactions, the wondrous ECAM itself loses the plot (who'd have thought that more than one problem at a time was possible). ....

Thanks for the informative post jb747, will be interesting to see how the FBW aircraft perform as they age and how their software deals with the other issues of ageing unreliability/erratic behavior of associated systems (like airspeed pitot tubes etc)

 

[jb747]

Thanks for the informative post jb747, will be interesting to see how the FBW aircraft perform as they age and how their software deals with the other issues of ageing unreliability/erratic behavior of associated systems (like airspeed pitot tubes etc)

Firstly, I have no problem, per se, with FBW aircraft. They bring a huge number of positives over 'fly by hydraulics'. Neither is directly connected to the flight controls. But, the issues lie with the interface between the crew and the aircraft. Airbus have taken a very different path to Boeing. Basically AB have built an aircraft for their engineers, whilst Boeing have built one for their test pilots. The question that needs to be asked is who is the more appropriate person to have built the aircraft for....

 

[MatF]

Many thanks for your extremely informative (and interesting!) posts, jb747. You really are an asset to these forums.

Probably a dumb question, but are there simple, mechanical fallbacks for unreliable instruments? Something like a plain old hemispherical bubble to tell your pitch and roll? (I'm sure I'm being too simplistic) - if they didn't seem to believe the attitude data? or are there enough backups?



Cheers,
Mat.

 

[Tortuga]

Well, I believe that we will see many more examples of this sort of thing in coming years. We're arriving at a point in aviation history in which the people who run the airlines have decided that they would prefer to have 200 hour cadets in aircraft, rather than people with experience in the real world (i.e. GA and air force)...not because they are better, but because they are cheap. Helping to drive this along is (mostly) Airbus, who have been telling these same managers that their aircraft are so safe, that they don't need real pilots.

Sadly, they are telling a couple of porkies. Their aircraft are every bit as subject to failures as previous aircraft. Minor failures can be handled quite easily, and generally with minimal system knowledge, simply by following the instructions. But, as soon as the failures require a deeper understanding of the systems, and their interactions, the wondrous ECAM itself loses the plot (who'd have thought that more than one problem at a time was possible). The base concept has been to write a procedure for everything (and then expect this vast number of things to be remembered). They have merrily removed most of the feedback and clues that pilots have used for years, generally (but not always) replacing them with numbers, hidden away, somewhere on the displays (no interconnection between joysticks, thrust levers that don't move with power changes, and which can even give non intuitive thrust changes). Ergonomically, the placement of identical switches, with dangerous, and totally different outcomes, within inches of each other (presumably because it looks tidy).

But, the biggest issue is that the aircraft, will revert to lower grades of flight control capability fairly easily. When they do so, they pretty much invariably remove the autopilot, flight directors, and auto thrust. So, we take pilots who've been chosen for good memory, but not flying ability, put them in an aircraft which is mostly easy to fly, and then take away all of their automatics, and simultaneously make the aircraft much more difficult to fly.

I appreciate the honesty, doesn't make me feel any more comfortable flying though I guess all you can do is cross your fingers the people in control of the aircraft happen to be ones capable to do the job when things get bad. What else can you do except not fly or try and choose flights with Boeings !!! :shock: