Air France passenger jet drops off radar

[rechoboam]

I would sort of tend to think there is only so many ways to make the nose go up that far eh, and pulling back on the controls would have to be high on the list and if the instruments are saying that is the attitude (and you believe what they are reading) you might ask what is everyone doing??

I guess it just happened all so quickly that there may not have been time for a whole bunch of rational thoughts to take hold... Amazing they crashed from that high in only a couple of minutes...

Would the G-forces have prevented clear thinking? They mention TOGA not once but several times for example.

 

[jb747]

Would the G-forces have prevented clear thinking? They mention TOGA not once but several times for example.

What G forces? You need a pitch response to generate any g, and they weren't getting one. It was most likely doing some shaking and shuddering, but that's the extent of it. Basically one g all the way down.....

 

[Must...Fly!]

The French Air Safety Authority BEA will release their final report in to the Air France crash on July 5.

I will actually be in Paris that day - no doubt it will be all over the news. As it should be.

Having reviewed some of the previous preliminary reports this afternoon, it just reinforces my stance that I will never board an Air France flight. (Whether that's rational or not is another story, but whatever).

 

[jb747]

The French Air Safety Authority BEA will release their final report in to the Air France crash on July 5.

I will actually be in Paris that day - no doubt it will be all over the news. As it should be.

Having reviewed some of the previous preliminary reports this afternoon, it just reinforces my stance that I will never board an Air France flight. (Whether that's rational or not is another story, but whatever).

As the report will (or at least should) be critical of both AF and AB, I expect the French newspapers will relegate it to page 403.

 

[Danger]

As the report will (or at least should) be critical of both AF and AB, I expect the French newspapers will relegate it to page 403.

Air Berlin were involved in this? Or does AB refer to something else?

 

[flyingfan]

Air Berlin were involved in this? Or does AB refer to something else?

I believe jb747 is referencing Air France and Airbus.

 

[samh004]

An interesting story popped up in my newsfeed today, Was Air France Captain With a Woman When Flight 447 Was in Trouble? - ABC News

Obviously no proof, and would it have mattered if the captain was in his seat anyway? I guess he would have been less likely to stall the plane.

 

[docjames]

Nothing like coming up with a story that is impossible to prove, with the core player unable to defend themselves.

 

[jb747]

If the guy was asleep it would take well over a minute to get him back. Remember too that the crew rest in NOT within the coughpit, but is on the far side of a security door.

The upshot is that the failure was simple and should have been easily handled. The fact that it was so dramatically mishandled is amazing, and points the finger at both pilot training and also the deskilling that Airbus have been a leading proponent of. The fact that the sidesticks are not interlinked, and so one pilot has no idea whatsoever as to the inputs being made by the other, is a one reason behind Boeing's decision to stick with yokes, even in digital aircraft.

 

[eastwest101]

... also the deskilling that Airbus have been a leading proponent of. The fact that the sidesticks are not interlinked, and so one pilot has no idea whatsoever as to the inputs being made by the other, is a one reason behind Boeing's decision to stick with yokes, even in digital aircraft.

I suspect that we will hear a lot more expert witnesses talking about this and pilot training in future potential court proceedings....

 

[Awesom Andy]

Given the chaos in the coughpit, I don't think it would've made a difference whether the captain was with a woman or not. Of course, we can always trust the British having a dig at the French at every opportunity (and vice versa).

 

[TonyHancock]

Of course, we can always trust the British having a dig at the French at every opportunity (and vice versa).

Don't know what you mean!!

This whole rather sad incident really worries me. I wonder how many other airlines provide the same lack of training to their air crews.

 

[Moody]

An interesting story popped up in my newsfeed today, Was Air France Captain With a Woman When Flight 447 Was in Trouble? - ABC News

Obviously no proof, and would it have mattered if the captain was in his seat anyway? I guess he would have been less likely to stall the plane.

The Captain made a few careless errors - he was not familiar with the qualifications of the co-pilot he left in charge, he did not properly assess the weather system they were approaching, and he did not leave clear instructions when he called the 2nd co-pilot into the coughpit. A possible explanation is that he was preoccupied with being somewhere else at the time. Then when things went pear-shaped less than 10 minutes later it took him nearly a minute to respond to the increasingly frantic calls for his return and did not act decisively when he came back into the coughpit.

In fact as he walked back in the stall warning had just gone off, they were at around 35,000 feet, the engines were at TO/GA , they were nose up (approaching 15%) and falling rapidly (10,000ft/min). There is only one scenario that fits those parameters but the captain at no time identified the stall they were in or tried to take control from the flying co-pilot. I think the press (and Airbus) will have a field day with him and conjecture that he was thinking with the little head instead of the big one, regardless of the fact that we will never know.

 

[flyingfan]

The Captain made a few careless errors - he was not familiar with the qualifications of the co-pilot he left in charge.

As Air France saw fit to appoint the two younger pilots as first officers, wouldn't that mean the airline felt both were capable of being the Pilot Flying for all conditions :?: The captain should have the confidence that in his absence the first officers have the training and experience to handle all but the most extreme of situations, and not have to 'babysit' any of them :?:

 

[v8Statesman]

As Air France saw fit to appoint the two younger pilots as first officers, wouldn't that mean the airline felt both were capable of being the Pilot Flying for all conditions :?: The captain should have the confidence that in his absence the first officers have the training and experience to handle all but the most extreme of situations, and not have to 'babysit' any of them :?:

Training maybe. Experience. Doubtful.


Sent from my Telstra iPhone using the Australian Frequent Flyer application.

 

[jb747]

The Captain made a few careless errors - he was not familiar with the qualifications of the co-pilot he left in charge, he did not properly assess the weather system they were approaching, and he did not leave clear instructions when he called the 2nd co-pilot into the coughpit. A possible explanation is that he was preoccupied with being somewhere else at the time. Then when things went pear-shaped less than 10 minutes later it took him nearly a minute to respond to the increasingly frantic calls for his return and did not act decisively when he came back into the coughpit.

Quite honestly, he was entitled to believe that AF had given him suitably qualified FOs. Presumably he had also flown the first leg of the trip with them as well. There is always weather at the equator. ANY FO qualified to act as relief should be able to handle it, otherwise he simply should not be there. If the captain had to be on duty around any weather he'd never get a break.

In fact as he walked back in the stall warning had just gone off, they were at around 35,000 feet, the engines were at TO/GA , they were nose up (approaching 15%) and falling rapidly (10,000ft/min). There is only one scenario that fits those parameters but the captain at no time identified the stall they were in or tried to take control from the flying co-pilot. I think the press (and Airbus) will have a field day with him and conjecture that he was thinking with the little head instead of the big one, regardless of the fact that we will never know.

Well, if he entered the coughpit over a minute after it all went pear shaped (and that is quite a quick time), the aircraft cannot have still been at FL350.

Taking control means getting into the seat. This wouldn't have been a smooth event, and doing so would not have been easy. Perhaps not even possible. The problem is that there was no easily way for him to see that the joystick was being held full aft. If it had been where it should have been, the attitude, power and performance displayed would have made no sense at all...we understand it simply because we know what control inputs were being made. Remember too, that much of the displayed data was blank.

Airbus spent a lot of effort convincing people that their aircraft can't be stalled. In normal law, that's almost true (there is one way that I think it can be done, but I'll refrain from testing it). The switch to either alternate or direct, does bring up an ECAM, but that's quite likely to be hidden in an avalanche of warnings. The PFD change that goes with it is quite subtle.

I see this whole accident as another version of the Buffalo Dash 8 crash. Deskilled pilots, coupled with aircraft that change character dramatically after quite minor failures, will be an increasing part of the toll.

 

[Moody]

Quite honestly, he was entitled to believe that AF had given him suitably qualified FOs. Presumably he had also flown the first leg of the trip with them as well. There is always weather at the equator. ANY FO qualified to act as relief should be able to handle it, otherwise he simply should not be there. If the captain had to be on duty around any weather he'd never get a break.

Reading from the 3rd interim BEA report on AF447 (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3.en/pdf/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf ) there is some deviation from the required briefing procedure. Also in the full transcripts (can't locate them at the moment) the captain asked the junior co-pilot if he was qualified (or words to that effect) before leaving him to fly the plane.

Well, if he entered the coughpit over a minute after it all went pear shaped (and that is quite a quick time), the aircraft cannot have still been at FL350.

It does sound incredible, but according to the recorders that is exactly what happened. In fact the stall warning stopped as he entered the coughpit because the AoA and other data had gone outside the envelope and the plane itself stopped believing what was happening.

 

[jb747]

Reading from the 3rd interim BEA report on AF447 (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3.en/pdf/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf ) there is some deviation from the required briefing procedure. Also in the full transcripts (can't locate them at the moment) the captain asked the junior co-pilot if he was qualified (or words to that effect) before leaving him to fly the plane.

Whilst airlines lay down briefing requirements, they really don't make the difference between a good operation and bad. A pilot should be able to self brief within a minute or so of getting into the seat. Remember too, that only one FO was changed....the other was already there, so there was continuity.

 

[jb747]

It does sound incredible, but according to the recorders that is exactly what happened. In fact the stall warning stopped as he entered the coughpit because the AoA and other data had gone outside the envelope and the plane itself stopped believing what was happening.

Just had another look at the report you referenced. I'd forgotten how much they'd climbed at the start of the whole thing.

All that needed to be done was to hold the same attitude (about 2.5 degrees) that they'd been flying since they levelled off, whilst disconnecting the auto thrust and setting the power to slightly higher than it had been (about 2%). With that done they might have accelerated by a few knots, but there would have been no substantial divergence.

 

[markis10]

A French report has found that human error and technical malfunctions caused an Air France flight to crash in 2009, killing 228 people, an source close to the case said. The judicial report, due to be presented to the families of the victims today, has concluded that pilot error and malfunctioning speed sensors were responsible for the crash of the plane en route from Rio to Paris, the source said.

'Pilot error behind Air France crash' | News.com.au