Air France passenger jet drops off radar

[tgh]

I have been following this on Pprne for ages.
The outcome is exactly as I expected.
Stalling , spinning and recovering a small aircraft ( my experience level ) in the sunshine is a quite different experience to the nightmarish scenario they were faced with.
I am haunted by a chat with a high hour captain who was now flying out of Asia for peanuts so he could fly an aircraft by direct control.

Lets all hope there are real changes

 

[haydensydney]

75 bodies recovered from Air France crash

Seventy-five bodies have been recovered from wreckage of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean two years ago, Brazil's state news agency says.

Good for the families. I wasn't aware that bodies could survive intact for that long under water ??

 

[Ansettaddict123]

75 bodies recovered from Air France crash



Good for the families. I wasn't aware that bodies could survive intact for that long under water ??

I read elsewhere that they actually thought the bodies underwater would have fared better than those that ended up on the surface simply because of the colder water and lack of bacteria and light etc. Hopefully this way they can establish causes of death and give families a sense of closure, at least in one sense.

 

[serfty]

I read elsewhere that they actually thought the bodies underwater would have fared better than those that ended up on the surface simply because of the colder water and lack of bacteria and light etc. Hopefully this way they can establish causes of death and give families a sense of closure, at least in one sense.

There was a general consistency from the recovered bodies found floating shortly after the crash in that most were showing signs of being in the 'brace position' on impact.

 

[Mrmaxwell]

Still want cadets in airliners?

jb747 I love your informative posts.

Is it possible the pilots had no idea they were actually falling out of the sky due to all the alarms going off? In the extreme weather, at night, 4hrs into a flight, with all those alarms going off must have been a scary proposition for a junior pilot. Ze logic behind the Airbus computer rejecting errors because they must be incorrect is frightening!

 

[docjames]

Here's a nice interpretation of the released info from Flight Global - detechnicalises it all a little bit (and probably saves jb747 some work explaining every detail to us all!)

AF447: After two long years, six short minutes - Flight International

 

[Alanslegal]

Is it possible the pilots had no idea they were actually falling out of the sky due to all the alarms going off?

I would be guessing the pilots knew they were doing down because it is mentioned one of the pilots indicated a flight "level 100" somewhere in the recording. From FL 380 minutes ago to now to FL 100, I think yes they would have known.

 

[Smackbum]

I am still stunned by how quickly this tragedy unfolded. Within a minute of the autopilot disengaging (for reasons not confirmed as yet but possibly due to inconsistent airspeed readings from the pitot tubes), the pilot in control had effectively stalled the aircraft. Less than a minute later the captain entered the coughpit with the aircraft at nearly 45% nose-up (he must have struggled to get there), full power on the engines, and a descent rate of 10,000 feet/minute.

Less than three minutes later the aircraft slammed into the ocean.

I know we don't have full transcripts of the coughpit recordings, but the comment at the end of the original interim report that "the inputs made by the PF were mainly nose-up" seem completely illogical. Wouldn't the captain's first action be to ensure the nose was pushed down as hard and fast as possible? Isn't there some visual indication of control position that would make the captain and the more senior co-pilot aware that the craft was being kept nose up by the flying pilot?

I think the full conversations in those last few minutes will explain why their collective actions were so ineffectual.

 

[markis10]

Wouldn't the captain's first action be to ensure the nose was pushed down as hard and fast as possible? Isn't there some visual indication of control position that would make the captain and the more senior co-pilot aware that the craft was being kept nose up by the flying pilot?

I think the full conversations in those last few minutes will explain why their collective actions were so ineffectual.

JB747 covered this in an earlier post, its more than likely they were following normal checklist procedures not aware that alternate law was in place:

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.en.pdf

Discussion of this with a couple of other pilots came up with a couple of thoughts. Firstly, until very recently, the memory item response to loss of airspeed had, as a first item, selection of 5 degrees nose up, and TOGA thrust, but it had no consideration of what the aircraft was actually doing, so the initial climb could well have been a 'perfect' response to their checklist. Secondly, in normal situations, the use of up to full backsick will have no adverse affects at all...you simply cannot stall the aircraft. All well and good, but it means you need totally distinct responses to flying the aircraft depending upon the law it's in...and you have to realise that it has changed.

 

[ColinP]

with the aircraft at nearly 45% nose-up (he must have struggled to get there),

Without going back to look at the exact numbers. The aircraft was NOT 45 deg nose up. I believe it was around 10 deg or less. The ANGLE of ATTACK was around 40 deg which is a totally different thing that others can probably explain better than me.

 

[MatF]

I'll tell you what, I hope my flyophobic wife never reads any of this, or I'll never get her into an aircraft again.

I love flying, but reading through some of this scares the cough out of me.

 

[Moody]

JB747 covered this in an earlier post, its more than likely they were following normal checklist procedures not aware that alternate law was in place:

No - if you read the transcript, the co-pilot called out the fact that they were in alternate law.

 

[Smackbum]

Without going back to look at the exact numbers. The aircraft was NOT 45 deg nose up. I believe it was around 10 deg or less. The ANGLE of ATTACK was around 40 deg which is a totally different thing that others can probably explain better than me.

My bad. When the captain enters the coughpit the pitch was around 15 degrees - still an obvious clue I would have thought.

 

[markis10]

No - if you read the transcript, the co-pilot called out the fact that they were in alternate law.

The full transcript has not been published, so I have not read it AFAIK, if you mean the BEA update, note the fact that although the NFP reports alternate law, its not mentioned if this is acknowledged or read back, in aviation assumptions are not permitted for important information. Time and time again we see replays of disasters where one crew member has a better grip on the situation but they are not the one with command of the controls!

 

[jb747]

As you can well imagine, there has been a lot of conversation about this, in both bars and coughpits, over the past few days.

The most interesting data, which we really have no access to yet, will relate to whatever the flight control logic of the aircraft was up to during the event, and just what it was telling the pilots.

Even though the aircraft is called as being in alternate law at one point (most likely alternate law 2), there's another possibility. Airbus have yet another 'law' called the abnormal attitude law. At extreme attitudes, speeds (fast or slow), or angles of attack, this law will activate, and basically the aircraft goes to direct law (pitch and roll direct, rudder alternate).

For the life of me though, I cannot understand the references to the pilot flying having inputs of up to full aft stick applied. That just isn't how you fly an aircraft (!). BUT, it is how you can fly when in NORMAL law.

 

[Smackbum]

Another report AVweb with an interesting claim :-

The pilots of Air France Flight 447 flew the aircraft into deep stall at 38,000 feet, never verbally acknowledged or corrected that condition, and the aircraft fell for more than three minutes at nearly 11,000 feet per minute into the Atlantic, killing all aboard, investigators said Friday. The jet maintained a nose up attitude -- along with an angle of attack greater than 35 degrees -- throughout a descent rate that translates to more than 122 miles per hour of vertical drop. "At no point" on the coughpit voice recorder "is the word stall ever mentioned," Chief Investigator Alain Bouillard said in an interview.

Talk about the elephant in the room.

 

[markis10]

Well the BEA have now published an interesting update, although the website is interesting in itself:

[h=1]Flight AF 447 on 1[SUP]st[/SUP] June 2009

A330-203, registered F-GZCP[/h]
Due to high volume demand the access to the website could be perturbed

FLIGHT AF 447


The updated findings make for interesting reading in regards the competency and training of the crew:

• Even though they identified and announced the loss of the speed indications, neither of the two copilots called the procedure "Unreliable IAS"
• The copilots had received no high altitude training for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure and manual air craft handling
• No standard callouts regarding the differences in pitch attitude and vertical speed were made
• There is no CRM training for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief Captain
• The approach to stall was characterised by the triggering of the warning, then the appearance of buffet
• A short time after the triggering of the stall warning, the PF applied TO/GA thrust and made a nose-up input
• In less than one minute after the disconnection of the autopilot, the airplane was outside its fligh t envelope following the manual inputs that were mainly nose-up
• Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope, the airplane’s longitudinal movements were consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces
• Neither of the pilots made any reference to the stall warning
• Neither of the pilots formally identified the stall situation

Air France have issued a comment on the update:

Air France - Corporate : Air France?s reaction to the publication of the BEA?s third intermediate report

During this time, the crew, comprising both First Officers and the Captain, showed an unfailing professional attitude, remaining committed to their task to the very end. Air France pays tribute to the courage and determination they showed in such extreme conditions.
At this stage, there is no reason to question the crew’s technical skills.

 

[jb747]

So, what does the 'Unreliable airspeed' procedure include, and would it have helped?

It's a simple enough procedure. Basically it tells you to turn off autopilot, autothrust, and flight director, and asks for the selection of 5 degrees of pitch, and CLB power. Cruising along at F350 that will simply destabilise the aircraft. In this instance, the pilot has selected in excess of 10 degrees of pitch...there is no circumstance in which an A3(anything) would have sufficient performance to use that attitude at any sort of altitude. Even 5 degrees (as per the procedure) and full power, will soon have the aircraft decelerating, and entering the same sort of scenario...albeit with a slower rate of entry.

The real hint is in the lead in line to the procedure, where it states 'if safe conduct of the flight impacted'.... Realistically, it isn't. You'll need to get rid of the automatics (and they are more than likely to disengage of their own accord anyway)...but, at that point, the next thing to do is NOTHING. If you leave the power exactly where it was set, and leave the attitude at 2.5 degrees nose up...pretty much nothing will happen. Goes back to a very old aviation rule....power+attitude=performance.

From the flight recorder data, it has been established that the combination of multiple improbable factors led to the disaster in less than four minutes: the icing of the Pitot probes was the initial event that led to the disconnection of the autopilot, the loss of associated piloting control protections and considerable roll movements. After the manoeuvres carried out by the crew in deteriorated and destabilizing piloting conditions, the aircraft stalled at high altitude, could not be recovered and struck the surface of the Atlantic Ocean at high speed. It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crew’s difficulty in analyzing the situation.

Misleading airspeed and angle of attack warnings happen surprisingly often. Most of us get to see simultaneous stall and overspeed warnings at some stage in our careers (it's a fault in the warning system). Use the equation above, and all is well.

I simply cannot understand the ongoing nose up inputs, especially once they called that they were in alternate law..in which case the normal angle of attack protections no longer work. Perhaps this is the sort of performance we'll all be able to look forward to as 200 hour cadets start to become the aviation 'norm'.

 

[Reggie]

The real hint is in the lead in line to the procedure, where it states 'if safe conduct of the flight impacted'.... Realistically, it isn't. You'll need to get rid of the automatics (and they are more than likely to disengage of their own accord anyway)...but, at that point, the next thing to do is NOTHING. If you leave the power exactly where it was set, and leave the attitude at 2.5 degrees nose up...pretty much nothing will happen. Goes back to a very old aviation rule....power+attitude=performance.


Misleading airspeed and angle of attack warnings happen surprisingly often. Most of us get to see simultaneous stall and overspeed warnings at some stage in our careers (it's a fault in the warning system). Use the equation above, and all is well.

I simply cannot understand the ongoing nose up inputs, especially once they called that they were in alternate law..in which case the normal angle of attack protections no longer work. Perhaps this is the sort of performance we'll all be able to look forward to as 200 hour cadets start to become the aviation 'norm'.

Thanks jb747, it is always good to receive the thoughts of someone knowledgeable (extremely) with regards to items like this.

 

[Awesom Andy]

I might get flamed for this, but the way I read it is, the crash is caused by inadequate training and/or procedures, or at the very least, set procedures were not followed. This then led to pilot errors and the eventual loss of the aircraft with all souls on board. I would guess that this is also where the culture of the airline management/workforce comes into play.