The interesting takeaway here is that they’ve effectively split the 12 aircraft into two categories: six allocated to “new ULH PTP routes” (e.g. SYD–LHR, SYD–JFK) and six allocated to “network diversification” (i.e. replacing 787-9s on existing routes and allowing those aircraft to be redeployed elsewhere). I appreciate the actual airframes will rotate between both roles as required.
Most people had assumed all 12 aircraft were destined for the ULH point-to-point network, potentially including future MEL services.
That raises a couple of questions. They must have modelled this strategy when placing the order, but at what point did it become the preferred outcome? And if around half the fleet is effectively being used on existing routes, did they really need to order the full complement of higher-cost ULR aircraft?
Perhaps the answer lies in the claimed 25% increase in freight capacity, combined with the higher premium cabin mix. But is that enough to justify the ULR premium on routes that don’t actually require the additional range? Could the same outcome have been achieved with a standard A35K and premium heavy config?
