B737 Waterbomber crashes in south of W.A. Both pilots said to be not seriously injured but in hospital.

A few factors caused this.
US fire pilots are rated on the difficulty of the drop, so harder is better and gains you cred. They are not worried about risk.
The bird dog was too low when it guided the 737 in
The 737 was too low and too slow (100 knots is the number I am being quoted) on the drop run
As they completed the drop and pulled up, they either hit a tree with an engine or vege was sucked into an engine (Pilots understandably are not quite sure on this one)
They then hit a small ridge/jumpup with the tail as they climbed which was not noticeable previously
The result is a bent plane.

It broke in half on impact. The pictures in post #29 are from the bird dog about a minute after the impact and shows no damage to the coughpit.
 
A few factors caused this.
US fire pilots are rated on the difficulty of the drop, so harder is better and gains you cred. They are not worried about risk.
The bird dog was too low when it guided the 737 in
The 737 was too low and too slow (100 knots is the number I am being quoted) on the drop run
As they completed the drop and pulled up, they either hit a tree with an engine or vege was sucked into an engine (Pilots understandably are not quite sure on this one)
They then hit a small ridge/jumpup with the tail as they climbed which was not noticeable previously
The result is a bent plane.

It broke in half on impact. The pictures in post #29 are from the bird dog about a minute after the impact and shows no damage to the coughpit.

That's very authoritative.

On what basis do you make such specific assertions?
 
I believe the on-site investigation is done, and there's a team now working on retrieving the remains of the aircraft.
 
They are not worried about risk.
Seriously? If they aren't worried about risk, then they should not be in an aircraft. They may need to accept more than the usual dose of risk, but it should be carefully calculated, with the minimum necessary accepted for any 'job'.
The 737 was too low and too slow (100 knots is the number I am being quoted) on the drop run
Well, it hit the ground, so it was obviously too low. 100 knots is the GROUND SPEED reported by FR24. That's extremely unlikely to have been their TAS, which what is relevant to how an aircraft flies. Of great relevance is their sink rate. The higher it is, the more time and altitude is require to neutralise and reverse it. Of course, too little airspeed, coupled with a high sink rate is a recipe for a poor outcome.
As they completed the drop and pulled up, they either hit a tree with an engine or vege was sucked into an engine (Pilots understandably are not quite sure on this one)
Nothing is sucked into an engine at 100 knots plus. You're simply running into it. Given the speed, I'd expect they had zero ability to actually 'pull up'.

I work for a fire authority that has aircraft.
I don't think that really makes you an expert.
 
Seriously? If they aren't worried about risk, then they should not be in an aircraft. They may need to accept more than the usual dose of risk, but it should be carefully calculated, with the minimum necessary accepted for any 'job'.

Well, it hit the ground, so it was obviously too low. 100 knots is the GROUND SPEED reported by FR24. That's extremely unlikely to have been their TAS, which what is relevant to how an aircraft flies. Of great relevance is their sink rate. The higher it is, the more time and altitude is require to neutralise and reverse it. Of course, too little airspeed, coupled with a high sink rate is a recipe for a poor outcome.

Nothing is sucked into an engine at 100 knots plus. You're simply running into it. Given the speed, I'd expect they had zero ability to actually 'pull up'.


I don't think that really makes you an expert.
Well I have been told haven't I.

You obviously are not across the US and Canadian pilot fire fighting culture, and the industry. What you would call risk in your QF plane would make them laugh. What they call risk would make you wet your pants. Have you ever seen a VLAT doing a drop? You Tube has plenty of vids for you to enjoy.

When the pilot states he was at 100 knots all you can do is accept it. You, seem to know that's not the case.

I'll state they sucked a tree into an engine. I gather from your response you'll know exactly what was ingested. All I am doing is relaying what the pilots stated, which as I said they were a bit unsure of, due to the fact they were about to drop a 737 shortly thereafter and didn't have time to look out the window to see what was doing.

I never claimed to be an expert.
 
I was at Fitzgerald River NP (Fitzgerald River National Park, Fitzgerald River National Park » Fitzgerald Coast) early last week, camping at Four Mile Campground, which is on the east side, near the area of the fire and where the aircraft crashed.

As I previously noted, FR NP is not remote, but it is inaccessible, particularly the central area. It is an internationally recognised Biosphere Reserve because of its extremely rich biodiversity. Think World Heritage. A key concern is spread of the ‘Dieback’ root pathogen fungus. Hence there are almost no roads or tracks within the park, which is really divided into separated E and W sections. The only way to go between them is to drive right around.

The map shows that, and the red arrows show where Hamersley Drive was closed. Hamersley Drive is a good 2WD dirt road between the arrows. I have marked the crash site. A 4WD only track runs SW from near there to two coastal spots, Quoin Head and Whalebone Beach.

As can be seen, the crash was very close to Hamersley Drive and that 4WD track. As might be expected, road access to the crash area was closed when I was there. On the S side, gates where Hamersley Drive changes from bitumen to dirt were firmly locked.

What piqued my attention as I drove out from Hopetoun was the digital trailer sign stating that roads within the park were closed because of “dieback spread”. Clearly a distracting fib at this warm and dry time of the year when it’s the most likely time they would be open. (There were no road closed signs at the N entry to the W side of the park when I subsequently drove past.)

FRNP1.JPG

I’m not an aviator; my interest from that perspective is purely vicarious. I am, however, a biologist and there are several things from a biological perspective that intrigued me about this incident.

As previously posted, I felt it important to clarify the type of vegetation in the area and the consequent nature of the fire. It was not, and could not be, a raging crown fire in tall, dense Eucalypt forest.

That seemed to be an assumption many people made – likely because that is the typical scenario where these large water bombers are seen in action. To that extent, it was therefore not unreasonable – but an assumption without foundation and far from accurate, nevertheless.

Juan Browne (
) questioned why the Australian authorities were using such a firebombing procedure in ‘scrubland’. The context clearly being that it’s not worth risking your life for that.

I must say, being familiar with the landscape of Fitzgerald River NP, that my immediate thought when I first saw the report of the crash was that using a B737 there seemed like overkill. Not because of not valuing the biome, but because of the relatively low-intensity fire and not totally inaccessible terrain (a solid old 70 series Landcruiser with a steel bullbar could push through the scrub.)

On the face of it, it seemed a reasonable thing to question, when Air Tractors are widely used for firefighting from local strips across SW WA. (From FR24, some were operating out of nearby Ravensthorpe to that fire).

However, there may be particular biological and conservation factors at play that had the authorities scrambling to endeavour to stop the fire - moving SE to NW - in its tracks that caused them to call in the large tanker. The fire was clearly not a raging inferno critically threatening life and (man-made) property.

Perhaps they were wanting to prevent it jumping Hamersley Drive or the 4WD track into the large wilderness in the central N of the park.

Perhaps they were trying to avoid as much as possible vehicle movement into undisturbed terrain because of Dieback spread concerns (even though it was at one of the few points for intersecting tracks in the E side of the park.)

Perhaps there was the threat of it getting into some localised pocket of sensitive terrain (borne out by the very cagey resident ranger intimating to me that there was a ridgeline, or some localised different topography, that they wanted to keep it out of.) Again, probably also related to minimising soil disturbance because of Dieback spread concerns. He did say all vehicles involved were washed down.

All that is purely speculation on my part, but consistent with the very high biological and conservation value attached to the park.

In fairness, ground wet by firefighting water and disturbed by firefighting vehicle movement could also partly be a reason why they were claiming ‘Dieback spread concerns’ on the road closure signs. But the main reason surely had to be keeping inquisitive people away from the crash remains, given its close proximity to Hamersley Drive and the 4WD track.

As I said, the ranger was very circumspect and couldn’t be drawn on very much at all. He did say that salvage work and soil sampling (I guess for hazardous contaminants) was in progress. He also said that it was the first time the B737 tanker had gone to FR NP.

When I said, “The pilots were very lucky.”, his response was “Ten feet higher and they would have been OK; two feet lower and it would have been a disaster.” Make of that what you will, but he definitely did not seem given to shooting off his mouth.

Topo map indicates some slight variation in terrain at the site.

FRNP2.JPG

Snip from the TV report simulation in Post #37, but it is clearly not Hamersley Drive that it ended up at, rather the 4WD track. The impact location was actually in as an accessible area of the park as could be hoped.

FRNP3.JPG

FRNP4.JPG

FRNP5.JPG

Here’s what the vegetation and soil is like not far S of the crash site. There is a smattering of taller (3-5m) spindly eucalypts in parts (see in the background of the top pic), but no large trees.

FRNP6.JPG

Going to some of the aviation matters and comments today, it was interesting that Juan Browne’s subsequent video to the Fireliner crash was about the final report of a crash in Canada of a ‘bird dog’ aircraft (
).

From about 1:20-3:00 minutes he reveals that he, in younger days, had experience in such a role and comments about how easy it is to become complacent. Whether that induces cowboy behaviour or not, clearly he regards that sort of flying as highly dangerous.

I’m wondering, and looking for pilot comment, whether the flat terrain with very short vegetation would possibly result in reduced situational awareness of just how close the terrain is? I’m thinking that most of the work that these large jet water bomber tanker pilots would do would be over tall forest with much more flames and smoke.

Could this fire situation in FR NP been so unusual and perhaps so seemingly benign that it led to misjudgements or complacency by the pilots and got them flying too low?

I can also imagine that the taller spindly scattered eucalypts extending above the main vegetation would be very difficult to see and that could account for the ‘tree into engine’ scenario.

My gut feeling is that there is something puzzling about this event from an aviation perspective. But, that said, I can’t imagine them walking away if they had impacted the terrain in real forest in rough terrain instead of on a thick carpet of soft vegetation in flat sand.
 
The reason for not putting vehicles in could well be the pathogens.
Whilst not familiar with WA practice, in NSW typically there is no provision for vehicle washdown either before or after being in a contaminated area. Multiple vehicle movements would be needed to get around the edge of the fire to contain it, and multiple vehicles and crews as well.
So the risk of pathogen transfer is massive and needs to be considered.

Logistically, the most amount of water a vehicle can carry is 4,000L and the smallest (a Landcruiser 70 series) is 5-600L. That's a lot of vehicles needed to hold the perimeter with water.
The other option is mechanically making a barrier ('cutting a trail') to stop the fire jumping. In that vegetation, it would probably only need to be a metre wide at most but stop to think - Old Mate is hanging off a rake hoe digging down to bare earth for a few hours. Hard, hot work. Also, despite the tear-inducing images of blackened fire fighters on TV, it gets very hard to source crews 3-4 weeks into a fire. They are just plain wore out. So managing the crew needs to be factored in. The oversea's crews that come to bigger fires are not dramatic, they fill a big gap towards the end of a campiagn.

The other option is to send in a skidsteer or bulldozer to cut a trail. The Biologist in you is now screaming; these things rip everything out of the ground and put it aside. And they don't go back and restore it either - that's up to the Rangers to sort out.
Another factor could be, this area has sensitive vegetation that is unique and loosing it could well mean the end of the species so it is high value. Include the animals inside it and a fire will decimate everything.
Now fire managers need to consider all those issues to make a plan. Combine that with social media and all the Brain Surgeons therein offering advice on how to stop the fire, the Minister is in the Fire Commissioners ear saying it don't look good (whilst espousing full support on the 6pm news)
In this case, a LAT may well be the most effective option to contain the fire. A 737 delivers 30,000L of retardant per drop and can cover a lot of area quickly. Air tractors only carry about 3,000L.

So, running the LAT out there (which is being leased at many thousands of dollars per day) pacifies all, especially Joe Public who demands to see their tax money spent wisely.

Consider this; in 2019/20 there was a spot over from the Spencer fire at Wisemans Ferry in NSW. It started next to the Bahai temple at Wisemans Ferry, where very few crews were. By the time crews got there, it had become more than a spot over. I was on the air desk that day and I tried to get a LAT on it to flatten it and make it go away. Back then cost was a concern so the $30,000 to send a LAT over it was deemed too expensive. That spot over turned into the Gospers Mountain fire and the bill was in the millions. They showed me, huh? Now, a LAT is more likely to be deployed sooner than later. That may have been another factor in the WA fire.

Back to our crash; if the pilots had been "10 feet higher" (Gee, I must know my cough then JB747) it would be a non-event, the fire goes out we all go home saying how good we were (or could have been - this is fire and aviation where the ego's are bigger than a A380 tailfin).

There a lot of factors that go into fire planning on a fire this size. It's very technical, dynamic and easy to get wrong. The first aim is to contain the perimeter, secure it and let it burn itself out in the middle. These are the 'going', 'contained' and 'controlled' terms you will hear being used.
 
I have it on good authority that in WA there is also political interference to get in the LATs. Incident Controllers may be told the LAT is heading their way. They may say it is not needed, only to be told it's a political directive - that may be timed for the evening TV news. A display of the government's commitment to 'protect the community' with what is seemingly portrayed as a 'silver bullet' solution.

I was also informed that another issue with bringing in the air tankers is that all ground operators have to evacuate the zone - which may take some time on narrow, winding forest tracks, during which time mopping up ceases and the fire continues to burn. 15 tonnes of liquid crashing down smashes branches and throws up large amounts of debris.

I was wondering whether another aspect of the FR NP incident could be that the terrain and fire was considered relatively benign and consequently may have been being used, at least partly, as a training operation?
 
I have it on good authority that in WA there is also political interference to get in the LATs. Incident Controllers may be told the LAT is heading their way. They may say it is not needed, only to be told it's a political directive - that may be timed for the evening TV news. A display of the government's commitment to 'protect the community' with what is seemingly portrayed as a 'silver bullet' solution.

I was also informed that another issue with bringing in the air tankers is that all ground operators have to evacuate the zone - which may take some time on narrow, winding forest tracks, during which time mopping up ceases and the fire continues to burn. 15 tonnes of liquid crashing down smashes branches and throws up large amounts of debris.

I was wondering whether another aspect of the FR NP incident could be that the terrain and fire was considered relatively benign and consequently may have been being used, at least partly, as a training operation?
Very possible that Management directed them to be used. As I said, many thousands of dollars are spent having them on stand by (the rate changes depending on the fire risk that day, with a 15 minute deployment being the highest). NSW has changed their attitude to 'not needed' to lets just put a drop on it.
Damn straight about ground and air ops. Get out the area. It's violent. Some Cal Fire advice
Rotary wings are not as bad as they are more a targeted drop from a Bambi bucket but fixed wings are very much an all-encompassing thing.

The US crews that come out here - especially ground crews - are not used to the lack of air support we have. They will call in a tanker as a matter of course. They get here and are stumped by the amount of paperwork needed to request aircraft. So, maybe WA are trialling/training for air support and did use this as a training day.
 
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@smckay, what is the altitude that LAT drops are generally made from and how much does it vary depending on the situation?
I don't know the actual answer to that one.
I do know its a decision made locally.

Somewhere up above it all is an Air Attack Supervisor in a rotary overseeing the fire and directing the bird dog. FYI, if you want a fire aviation job that's probably the best one to aim for.
The AAS tells the bird dog where to direct the V/LAT. The birddog is the lead plane that guides in the V/LAT to place the retardant; the white smoke left by the bird dog is the position and length of the drop. Second best job is a bird dog pilot/nav - NSW uses Cessna Citations which by all accounts are not a bad place to spend a day.
The folks in V/LAT follow it and do as instructed. Which is why some of the videos have short drops and some longer. It is the AAS who decides this.
As you have noted, each terrain is different and the heights are adjusted accordingly. This video shows some pretty low flying, especially in the bigger planes. But, as per my first post, the pilots are typically US and Canadian and they are not scared to go low and slow (must be the brisket they are bought up on).
I think the pilots must have some responsibility on height which is interesting that they were so low, with the bird dog taking them there.

A LAT is a Large Air tanker, usually a C130 or an RJ45
VLAT is a Very Large Air Tanker, currently a 737. We did use the DC10 but I think it guzzled too much juice. Or it was cheaper to buy the 737 and have Coulson operate it.
Sizes are based on the amount of retardant carried.

Fun fact - Australian CAA won't certify the 737 as a passenger plane even though it is fitted with seats. So crew can't travel with the plane and they need to go in another plane.
 
When I said, “The pilots were very lucky.”, his response was “Ten feet higher and they would have been OK; two feet lower and it would have been a disaster.” Make of that what you will, but he definitely did not seem given to shooting off his mouth.
That's a description that is very apt in many cases. The EK A340 that did the massive tail drag at Tullamarine is an excellent example. It barely cleared the concrete blocks attached to the lighting system, and I'm pretty sure hitting them would have been a game changer in the worst way. How many aircraft have only just failed to clear the top of a hill?
From about 1:20-3:00 minutes he reveals that he, in younger days, had experience in such a role and comments about how easy it is to become complacent. Whether that induces cowboy behaviour or not, clearly he regards that sort of flying as highly dangerous.
They may appear to be cowboys, but I'd expect the life expectancy to be very short for those who really are. Nevertheless, any of their flying will seem very dangerous to outsiders, especially as any of the planning that goes into it will not be evident to everyone. In the same way, the military does not suddenly send fighter pilots to sub 50 feet at high speed. It's all planned out as much as possible. It remains dangerous, but as much risk as possible is removed.
I’m wondering, and looking for pilot comment, whether the flat terrain with very short vegetation would possibly result in reduced situational awareness of just how close the terrain is? I’m thinking that most of the work that these large jet water bomber tanker pilots would do would be over tall forest with much more flames and smoke.
That's always a risk, but the aircraft are fitted with radar altimeters, so they shouldn't be in a vacuum with regard to their real altitude. The 'trees' of WA were well known though, for suckering RAAF students into being lower than intended.
Could this fire situation in FR NP been so unusual and perhaps so seemingly benign that it led to misjudgements or complacency by the pilots and got them flying too low?

I can also imagine that the taller spindly scattered eucalypts extending above the main vegetation would be very difficult to see and that could account for the ‘tree into engine’ scenario.

My gut feeling is that there is something puzzling about this event from an aviation perspective. But, that said, I can’t imagine them walking away if they had impacted the terrain in real forest in rough terrain instead of on a thick carpet of soft vegetation in flat sand.
It would seem to be a combination of too low, much too slow, and with far too high a sink rate. Using the FR24 numbers, they had something in the order of a 10º descent path at very low level. Given that the speed is not much above the stall, the AoA change necessary to arrest this rate of descent simply would not have been available. Basically they mushed into the ground. Note that the aircraft pitch attitude may have been above the horizon...but it's only the flight path vector that actually matters. If they'd been 10 feet higher, I think they still would have hit, but it would have been a couple of seconds later.
 
I just stumbled on this Blanclirio channel video the may be of interest:

Some interesting comments near the end about the motivation to be firebomber tanker pilot.
 
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I was also informed that another issue with bringing in the air tankers is that all ground operators have to evacuate the zone - which may take some time on narrow, winding forest tracks, during which time mopping up ceases and the fire continues to burn. 15 tonnes of liquid crashing down smashes branches and throws up large amounts of debris.

I've been waiting for an excuse to post this, which I found earlier (and its not a VLAT - 9 ,000lb Vs 170,000 lbs according to the commentary!, but dropped lower I guess). From 1m:20s
 
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Interesting reading, but no surprises. Mushed into the ground. Oops.

Could you elaborate on the technical term 'mushed', please jb? I'm guessing you mean a pancake encounter with terrain, as opposed to a violent steep impact?

What did they do wrong? To what degree did it appear to be poor aviating? Anything else?
 

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