Airport ID risk prompts electronic tickets and automatic baggage check-in rethink

Status
Not open for further replies.
It isn't so much e-tickets as it is OLCI and kiosk check-in, which basically breaks all human contact required and thus no ID checks. Heh, good ol' popular media misquoting or parliamentarians misappropriating information.

Even with bag drop, no ID required unless specifically requested or checking in from a desk (but most people would have a BP from kiosk or OLCI already).

If auto-check-in was banned then QF NGCI would be completely screwed, although we all know QF were not the first to have this kind of system, nor were they the first to possibly be embroiled in this kind of risk. NZ had their new check-in for a long time and the same issue was raised over there, too. Can't remember what the fat cats in the Bee Hive did about it, though, but I suspect banning all kiosk check-ins was not part of the answer.

As for the possible solutions to this issue:
  • Ban all forms of automated check-in - everyone must be processed by a human at a counter. Ridiculous idea and we're back in the stone age.
  • Only allow passengers into terminals. Security guards monitor all entrances to the terminal, and anyone entering must show photo ID and a valid ticket or boarding pass. No guests. Plausible but unpleasant scenario.
    You could have a similar situation except shift the ID check to security screening. This is similar to the US. You still can't have guests beyond the security screening point, but at least you can be seen off before that point and not just outside the airport.

The National Identity Card was floated by a previous government but for some reason was shot down horribly. I think the main issues were redundancy (i.e. why would you need it), data integrity (i.e. who would have access to the National ID database and how would it be protected) and the civil libertarians also had some issue with it.

I suspect you can't just automate the ID check at the kiosks, because someone could just lend you the ID that matches their name on the BP. You scan their ID and as long as no one is watching, the system thinks you're fine and you board as normal. So building in an extra step in the kiosk check-in process + an ID card reader is probably not going to work.
 
Plus ID cards would only be for Australian-citizens… which means a different system is needed for any domestic travellers who aren’t citizens :p

What’s wrong with just having faith in security and being extra careful in the air not to allow a would-be villain to get inside the coughpit? Most members of the public take air safety very seriously these days anyway and would probably stand up and help if something were to go down in the air. But there’s no need to make my life more complicated.
 
Personally, this all sounds like a little bit of BS to me.

I was asking myself where's the hard data and evidence to support claims by authorities that ' criminals are slipping under the radar because airlines do not conduct compulsory identification checks.'

So out of interest, I started digging around to see what I could find on the topic and exactly what was presented to the committee, rather than one members view.

For those who don't want to read all of this to get the picture of it - In summary, both the comments by the Senator and the conclusions drawn by the reporter simply blow the issue out of proportion.

This is highlighted by the fact that in the 2010 data discussed in the committee presentation, there were 7.11 Million domestic pax boardings in PER, and only 22 incidences of false identity. 22 out of 7.11 million is such a small number, and utilisation of the existing PACE system for domestic travel to track travel by persons with illegal intent would be far better than having to go all USA on the ID checking.

In short, the reporter, and quite frankly the committee chair are smoking something. :rolleyes:

And Sen. Hutchins seems to do quite well for himself when flying QF. Was digging in his most recent submission for the Register of Members Interests, and he scored two upgrades from J to F in July and August of 2009, one for LHR-SYD, and the other BKK-SYD. There was nothing on file with the electoral commission to give an idea of who his donors, if any are, thus no insight into who might be lobbying him for anything which was rather odd.

----

Now for those who like to read and see how I came to this conclusion, then enjoy the following.

The subject in question is within the purvew of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, which is currently conducting an enquiry into Adequacy of aviation and maritime security measures to combat serious and organised crime under its legislative purvew as defined by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Act 2010.

The committee met four times during 2010, one of which was to discuss the annual report of the Australian Crime Commission, and the other three related to the topic at hand. The last of these three meetings, held in Fremantle in November of that year seems to be the most relevant to the reported remarks.

The information which Sen. Hutchins uses to support his claims is based on a presentation at this meeting by members of the Western Australian Police Service (referred to herein as WAPOL). Namely, presenting were Det. Supt Carver of the Serious and Organised Crime Branch, Mr Padget - Leading Intelligence Analyst for the State Intelligence Division WAPOL, and Ms Plumb - who while an employee of WAPOL was appearing before the committee in a private capacity (read the transcript to understand this one, Sen Steve Fielding asked some questions to clear up why this was).

Ms Plumb lead the deputation, presenting for ~90min on the topic of Domestic airline passengers flying in false names: disorganising organised crime. The data presented was based entirely on data from WAPOL, and its findings, conclusion and summary was not representative of any juristiction outside of Western Australia. The impetus for Ms Plumb's research first came about in 2001 as a result of a request for submission to the Wheeler Enquiry.

Background done - here's the crux of the presentation. From the Full Year 2006 data collection and analysis, only 13 individual cases of this occuring could be found. So, not much of a compelling argument in terms of numbers to suggest that identity verification for domestic travel is a pressing issue.

Examination of the 2010 data doesn't give much more of an argument for this either, with only 19 of the 22 persons detected having used false names had known, provable links to organised crime. These 19 weren't exactly angles, with Ms Plumb noting;

They were importing and exporting commercial quantities of controlled drugs and using false names, documents and credit cards. So we are talking about really big operations now. The range of charges across these cases included conspiring to traffic commercial quantities of controlled drugs, in excess of 500 fraud charges, possession and production of false travel documents, importing commercial quantities of border controlled drugs, possession of stolen property, dealing in the proceeds of crime and possession of counterfeit money.
On page ACC8 of the transcript, Det. Supt Carver comments that the PACE alerting system used by law enforcment for tracking and alerting to travel of suspect persons is not currently extended to domestic travel, it only applies for international travel. Carver comments:

We do not have a domestic PACE alert, so in a serious and organised crime investigation it is very difficult for us and the states and territories to get in front of the play. Firstly, if they are using false identification, they could still use false identification even under a new regime, but the thing is that, if we have PACE alerts and we know they are using those false names and we have access to those manifests, it makes it very much easier to get in front of the play as far as investigations are concerned.
The rest of the comments on the transcript were quite boring, but I did discover this little nugget on the self-checking of bags on page ACC17 where the committee and deputation discussed the scenairo at some length.

Based on the scenairos presented, I doubt very much these would work - as it seems those members and deputation present haven't really seen or expeirenced how the technology works, and how unlikely and improbible the scenairo is of someone printing more tags then one needs and leaving a spare lying around for nefarious use.

If you remember from my blog and video review of QF's NGCI system, the kiosk specifically asks you how many bags are you checking in. The design of the screen by virtue of the spacing between buttons makes it near on impossible to accidently hit the wrong number, and if one did the back key can be easily pressed to make a correction.

On the issue of the Australia card, or some form of national identity system - this is simply not needed. If AvSec needed to check identities, existing state or federally issued ID should be sufficient for this purpose - we don't need more bureaucacy and wasteful in my opinion just for the purpose of identifying citizens. Reference was made to the UK system of biometric identification being introduced there, but the committee and deputation didn't say much more than that.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Whilst the data is suggestive that there is minimal risk because the number of cases is dwarfed by the actual number of travelers, one has to wonder how did they uncover these cases in the first place. Did the criminals confess that they did this? Or did they deduce that's how they moved the drugs about / how those involved in the crime were moving about? How do you know it was because there was no human contact - they could have forged identity documents instead, with the same result.

It's one thing to suspect, another thing to logically deduce and another thing to actually catch the act. Now how did they actually find out these people were cheating the system like this, if that is what they were doing.

Even if they found cases, how is one to know that there aren't other cases that haven't been found. This is a problem on both sides (i.e. the proponents argue on a loose foundation of potential other cases or speculate on other cases, whilst the naysayers may be denouncing the data when in fact the data does not represent the total number of real cases where people do travel with the wrong identity, which may be higher).

Also, whilst the number of cases are low, there is no indication as to the extent of the crimes (e.g. drug smuggling can involve some millions, depending on how long the 'operation' had been taking place). And then one does have to consider to what extent does this loophole actually contribute to the crime taking place. Of course, one could argue that drug runners / dealers should never have the opportunity to fly in the first place (i.e. they should have been caught well before any drugs could even leave the lab), thus it is still a fool's effort to consider new ID check measures.

Also, there's a huge crossing mess of ideas of identity theft, counterfeit identity and the 'crime' being described within this thread. All three 'misdemeanours' are very different to one another.
 
The constant talk of a national ID card in the article seems to suggest they're using airport security as a reason to introduce one. Seems to me the were a bit quick to can the access card project when they first got into government since all of a sudden it's a good idea.

And hey, if they want to ID people, they can do at either A) Security or B) the gate when boarding by showing acceptable photo ID such as a drivers licence or passport like you do on international flights. This seems to be the norm at many airports around the world. Why I was ID'd prior to going through security and the gate at Copenhagen on Tuesday.
 
  • Ban all forms of automated check-in - everyone must be processed by a human at a counter. Ridiculous idea and we're back in the stone age.
And hey, if they want to ID people, they can do at either A) Security or B) the gate when boarding by showing acceptable photo ID such as a drivers licence or passport like you do on international flights. This seems to be the norm at many airports around the world. Why I was ID'd prior to going through security and the gate at Copenhagen on Tuesday.

And after you walk away from the counter, you can give your ticket to anyone. As elbarto suggested, "Passport check @Gate, during boarding" is pretty much the highest form of security that could be enforced at present.
I'm sure that there was an article last year regarding this. QF security did want to go the USA way, where no guests were allowed past security. (Would have been an easy way to cut the WP 'anytime access' rule, that's for sure).

National ID, like Thailand, could be an option, with very, very harsh penalties for misuse. I'm all for that. Saves carrying a passport around Domestically.
 
Whilst the data is suggestive that there is minimal risk because the number of cases is dwarfed by the actual number of travelers, one has to wonder how did they uncover these cases in the first place.
From my reading of the committee transcript in question, it suggests that these occurances were discovered during the process of investegating possible crimes and after the event (flight) had taken place.

This supports the hypothisis behind the extension of the PACE alerting system for Australian domestic travel, an option suggested by the deputation as an alternative to full ID checking or other costly measures.

For those who skipped over the second part of the post, PACE is basically a watch list which looks at airline data, and generates a note to law enforcment where a person of interest, known alias, or other parameters travels by commercial air/sea transport.

At the moment, this system is only used for International travel, and for non-criminal means such as preventing cross-border travel/abduction of children who are the subject of custody issues before the family courts.
 
Heh, good ol' popular media misquoting or parliamentarians misappropriating information.

To be fair, this idea was not being floated by parliamentarians, but by the Australian Federal Police Association.
 
We have a national ID card. It's green and you really only need it when you're going for medical services.
 
Having already experienced an abusive QC check in person (back in 2002/3) I have learnt that ID checking by a real person is a joke anyway. IME I fronted the priority counter and presented my driver's licence (photo ID as required by the e-ticket conditions). Well the attitude started, rude cow. Gets to lugage tagging and I asked for priority tags. "is there a reason that you think you should get those". Well yes I'm a Qantas Club member for a start.

Anyway the point for my long story: The CSA then told me that I should have presented my QP card in that case. So if that was the check in staff's position when the ticket conditions required photo ID, making people check in with a person is not going to do anything to check the identity of the person presenting at the counter. Especially with criminals, here is my QP or QFF card, check in and then give it back afterwards. A QFF card can be had for free for any number of real or false names.
 
Last edited:
What I would like to know is why they think that being able to confirm that a passenger who is claiming to be John Smith really is John Smith means that said John Smith won't still try and board an aircraft whilst carrying explosives in his underwear.

Wife-"What are your plans for today dear'?
Husband" Well I was planning on trying to blow up a plane but now that I have to identify myself I'll go to the pub instead':mrgreen:
 
So why are planes so important, and not buses or trains? Do criminals exclusively use air travel as a means for their nefarious activities?
 
What I would like to know is why they think that being able to confirm that a passenger who is claiming to be John Smith really is John Smith means that said John Smith won't still try and board an aircraft whilst carrying explosives in his underwear.

I didn't get the impression that any of the discussion was about aviation security. It was more about law enforcement agencies being able to track peoples movements, and the lack of identification allows criminal figures to do this easily.
 
Whilst the data is suggestive that there is minimal risk because the number of cases is dwarfed by the actual number of travelers, one has to wonder how did they uncover these cases in the first place. Did the criminals confess that they did this? Or did they deduce that's how they moved the drugs about / how those involved in the crime were moving about? How do you know it was because there was no human contact - they could have forged identity documents instead, with the same result.

Some moron bureaucrat was probably browsing YouTube and found a video of the chaser episode where they bought tickets under the name Al Kyder
 
ID checking seems to be next to useless. After all the 9/11 terrorists used their own ID in checking in.
 
I suspect you can't just automate the ID check at the kiosks, because someone could just lend you the ID that matches their name on the BP. You scan their ID and as long as no one is watching, the system thinks you're fine and you board as normal.

This system already exits with ePassports. It compares your face, using digital facial recognition, with your passport photo. So big brother IS watching. You could scan the photo ID (drivers licence etc.) and compare that with the person standing in front of the camera.

Of course, a domestic system would need to be a lot quicker, or have about 50 machines at SYD, maybe 20 at ADL. They have two at ADL International at the moment.

The Chaser team highlighted this security flaw a few years ago when they bought DJ tickets in false names. They did on-line check-in. They went to the boarding gate but did not board the plane. They had their names called to board as the flight was otherwise fully boarded. They had booked and purchased the tickets in the names of Al Kyder and Terry Wrist.

Hilarious sketch. The message didn't get through until now.
 
Elevate your business spending to first-class rewards! Sign up today with code AFF10 and process over $10,000 in business expenses within your first 30 days to unlock 10,000 Bonus PayRewards Points.
Join 30,000+ savvy business owners who:

✅ Pay suppliers who don’t accept Amex
✅ Max out credit card rewards—even on government payments
✅ Earn & transfer PayRewards Points to 10+ airline & hotel partners

Start earning today!
- Pay suppliers who don’t take Amex
- Max out credit card rewards—even on government payments
- Earn & Transfer PayRewards Points to 8+ top airline & hotel partners

AFF Supporters can remove this and all advertisements

The Chaser team highlighted this security flaw a few years ago when they bought DJ tickets in false names. They did on-line check-in. They went to the boarding gate but did not board the plane. They had their names called to board as the flight was otherwise fully boarded. They had booked and purchased the tickets in the names of Al Kyder and Terry Wrist.

Hilarious sketch. The message didn't get through until now.

You got me curious, so l did a youtube search and found it. Hilarious!

[video=youtube;W3grHjibNdA]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W3grHjibNdA[/video]

Shorter version below
[video=youtube;1FkYPV7Iwu4]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FkYPV7Iwu4[/video]
 
This system already exits with ePassports. It compares your face, using digital facial recognition, with your passport photo. So big brother IS watching. You could scan the photo ID (drivers licence etc.) and compare that with the person standing in front of the camera.

One of the things the old Access card or even the Australia card could have done, even though it was conceived as a consolidation of welfare cards. No doubt it could (would) have been expanded to become an identity card.

Australia Card - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Health and social services access card (Australia) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
So why are planes so important, and not buses or trains? Do criminals exclusively use air travel as a means for their nefarious activities?

Yes - that is a very good point. I don't understand the slant from the GOV and the AFP regarding crim activity. Maybe it would be cheaper and easier to employ drug and explosive dogs to the domestic terminals or a fully automated luggage X-ray system at the major centres seeing how the crims us air transport for their smuggling activities, and wouldn't even think of sending their stash by road freight, or golly me, in the boot of their car and driving from Sydney to Melbourne...

Someone in Canberra could make a lot of money selling "get serious" pills to the bureaucrats wasting tax payers money...
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Become an AFF member!

Join Australian Frequent Flyer (AFF) for free and unlock insider tips, exclusive deals, and global meetups with 65,000+ frequent flyers.

AFF members can also access our Frequent Flyer Training courses, and upgrade to Fast-track your way to expert traveller status and unlock even more exclusive discounts!

AFF forum abbreviations

Wondering about Y, J or any of the other abbreviations used on our forum?

Check out our guide to common AFF acronyms & abbreviations.
Back
Top