[h=3]
Have a look at this article, not from a newspaper but the American Chemical Society.  Unfortunately, on the ground in China virtually nothing has changed since this article - local party officials have all the power and all the pay-offs.  A large number of the Chinese offenders are PLA operated plants.[/h][h=3]About C&EN[/h] Chemical & Engineering News is a weekly magazine published by the  
American Chemical Society. C&EN editors and reporters based in  Europe, the U.S., and Asia cover science and technology, business and  industry, government and policy, education, and employment aspects of  the chemistry field.
  So in 2005 the Chinese Govt admitted to over 1,400 different peasant protests a week.  NGOs and journalists no longer wishing to operate in China put the real figure at many times that number.  For 'peasants' to protest sees them risk often at best broken bones, confiscation of land/homes to at worst execution.
[h=3]http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/83/8339china.html[/h][h=1]
Tempers Flare In China September 26, 2005[/h] 			[h=2]
Throughout the countryside, farmers demand improved environmental controls, but change is slow in coming[/h][h=3]
Peasant protests are a growing phenomenon in China. Li Lianjiang, an  associate professor of political science at Hong Kong Baptist  University, is an authority on Chinese peasant protests. He says that  whereas a few years ago, excessive and arbitrary taxation was the  peasants' main complaint, illegal land seizures and pollution are  becoming the main sources of contention. There were 74,000 protests in  China last year, according to official statistics. By comparison, Li  says, in 1993 there were 10,000 occurrences of such "public incidents,"  as authorities prefer to call them.[/h]For now, companies in China still enjoy considerable leeway if they  wish to pollute. In her 2004 book on the Chinese environment, "The River  Runs Black," 
Elizabeth C. Economy  notes that Chinese national environmental laws are vague and open to  interpretation by local officials. Citizens who wish to sue polluters  thus face considerable difficulty in showing that they have a case.
 An additional problem is the decentralization of Chinese environmental watchdogs. China's top environmental authority, the 
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), lacks power. And it's not clear that SEPA will be able to increase its influence in the near future. SEPA has little authority over the thousands--11,000 in all,  according to Economy--of environmental protection bureaus at the  provincial, municipal, township, and village levels in China. While  these agencies theoretically uphold national standards, they tend to  operate in ways that best suit the local government they are attached  to. They are aided by the vagueness of national regulations.
[h=3][/h]In recent years, Huo has been paying most attention to what he calls  the "cancer village," Huang Meng Ying. He tries to bring medical relief  to the villagers while anticipating that the problem will spread. "The  water is black, the food is poisoned--how could more people not get  sick?" he asks.
 According to Huo, the main culprit for the pollution is the Lianhua  Group, China's largest producer of monosodium glutamate, which employs  several thousand workers in the upstream city of Xiangcheng. The group  was fined about $1.2 million in 2003 for illegal emissions, despite  being majority owned by the government of Xiangcheng.
 If the pollution were not enough, Lianhua is scorned by the Chinese financial community. In November 2003, 
Xinhua Far East China Ratings  downgraded the long-term debt of Lianhua, claiming that its "internal  governance and internal control deviate significantly from the average  market norm." Xinhua was basing its opinion on a report prepared by a  team of government auditors.
 One of Lianhua's monosodium glutamate plants is a joint venture owned 51% by the Japanese firm 
Ajinomoto.  In faxed answers to questions from C&EN, Ajinomoto declined to  explain why it chose Lianhua as its partner back in the early 1990s.  But Ajinomoto hardly stands by the Chinese firm. It insists that all  cases of pollution are its partner's doing and points out that the  capacity of the joint venture is smaller than that of Lianhua's wholly  owned plants at the site.
 Ajinomoto further claims that the Lianhua-Ajinomoto venture operates  under the strict environmental controls of the local and central  governments and is subject to internal audits conducted by Ajinomoto's  Shanghai office. Ajinomoto adds that effluent from its plant is treated  by its own facilities before release.  Yet the Henan joint venture is the only one of Ajinomoto's 95  subsidiaries worldwide to be excluded from the company's 2004 corporate  and social responsibility report. And, unlike other Ajinomoto  subsidiaries, the venture in Henan is not the object of independent  audits.
 Back in Shenqiu, Huo is dismayed that Ajinomoto could claim that its  effluent is separate from Lianhua's. His on-site observations indicate  that the Ajinomoto venture is integrated into Lianhua's operations.