I agree with
serfty that it's naive to assume that JB would have engineered some sort of messianic resurrection at QF. QF is, in my view, disadvantaged as much as advantaged by its former flag carrier status and high public profile. Issues like heavy maintenance locations or serving bacon for breakfast which generate weeks of media coverage and "outrage" for QF are never an issue for VA. JB as QF CEO would have had to deal with the same union structure that has impeded AJ, and he'd also face the same fleet planning problems caused by the delay of the A380s and most crucially the 787s. Other than dramatically cutting 787 orders and buying a heap of A330s back in ~2008, I'm not sure what could have solved that problem. But, of course, back in 2008, the 787 was being delivered in 2009. And then in 2009, it was being delivered in 2010.... etc.
...sounds a lot like QF but without the loss-making long haul.
As an aside, I think JB's contribution to stabilising VA long haul has been valuable. They spent a couple of years throwing 777s to all sort of random places (HKT, JNB, NAN), where the aircraft was either too big / poorly configured (NAN and HKT) or didn't have enough engines (JNB). And trans-pac schedules were erratic for quite a while. Of course AUH only works because of the Etihad partnership, but for all the justifiable observations about JB creating a poor man's QF, VA was the first Australian airline to pursue a deep relationship with a ME carrier.
But it's a testament to the experience of QF that when they did it, the reservations systems talk to each other, status benefits worked well off the bat and QF even had enough clout to get EK to add a platinum tier to their frequent flyer program. Meanwhile, plenty of the less visited DL SkyClubs will ask you, "what's a Velocity?"