Japan Airlines plane in flames at Tokyo's Haneda airport

[Seat0B]

1st thing in a crisis, find someone to blame

The poor sod piloting the Dash8 is in the hot seat.

Human error is rife with similar.

And all of these observations are why many countries have adopted a “just culture” approach to aviation (and indeed to medicine) which allows for examination of the system to see why an incident might have occurred rather than just blame the last link in the chain, and also to encourage a thinking learning and improvement culture rather than a mindless compliance and blame culture.

 

[Quickstatus]

red warning lamp by the wing exits to indicate the engines are still running?

All systems have potential failure points. What if the red warning lamp is not illuminating but the engines are still warning?. Both require looking out

there are many very senior cabin crew on legacy airlines…inflight supervisors, pursers or cabin managers, that have vast experience of 20-30 years or more.

Covid pushed out a lot of these experienced crew who never went back. And what of the less legacy airlines who tend to have younger crew with maybe less experience. (I'm not saying cabin crew cannot initiate and evac)

 

[BAM1748]

And all of these observations are why many countries have adopted a “just culture” approach to aviation (and indeed to medicine) which allows for examination of the system to see why an incident might have occurred rather than just blame the last link in the chain, and also to encourage a thinking learning and improvement culture rather than a mindless compliance and blame culture.

Except we all know just culture is great in theory but not so great in practice.

 

[Seat0B]

Human error

Yes, nd what led to that error? Was it honestly just the error or deliberate wrong choice of an individual, or as suggested by the research and nicely summarised by @Quickstatus, what contributed to that error? Was it an impractical procedure leading to “everyone” taking short cut? Was it a particular view in some individuals/workteams that the rules did not apply to them, and why did they think that? Was it the case that everyone was doing it (whatever that was), so they thought it was OK? Did someone not understand something, but did not own that? Was it competing pressures meaning that in complying with one rule of procedure, the person necessarily defaulted on another? So many potential reasons for that point of human error.

edit: typos

 

[Seat0B]

Except we all know just culture is great in theory but not so great in practice.

Do we?

 

[RooFlyer]

Or do we get more cameras - internally and externally - to assist the flight crew?

I've long thought that. QF 32 - sending the SO back to see what the problem was. Not saying every inch could be covered, but surely say 6 cameras on critical areas could help in a structural/fire incident. Even if in retrospect ...

Of course in this incident, they probably would have been useless when the electronics were taken out ... but to me that doesn't negate a wider helpful role.

 

[MEL_Traveller]

All systems have potential failure points. What if the red warning lamp is not illuminating but the engines are still warning?. Both require looking out


Covid pushed out a lot of these experienced crew who never went back. And what of the less legacy airlines who tend to have younger crew with maybe less experience. (I'm not saying cabin crew cannot initiate and evac)

Agree, No system is perfect. But perhaps we need to look at the reasons why evacuations are reserved for the flight deck, whether those reasons still exist, and whether there’s technology or training to cover some of those barriers.

I did think about fledgling airlines, or airlines undergoing rapid expansion and with potentially inexperienced crew. dunno the answer to that. But also consider the pilots may be equally - comparatively - inexperienced.

There is a risk of injury from slide evacuations. Some of the data is now quite old on that. Do we need to get that updated to reflect the modern environment? If pilots are hesitant to order an evacuation because of potential injury, and that’s no longer supported, do we need to revisit the guidelines?

 

[jb747]

This is now the third evacuation I can think of where there have been potential delays in evacuation while waiting for the flight deck. In the Asiana SFO crash the pilot caused the accident, but then didn’t authorise an evacuation of the damaged aircraft.

Given that the aircraft (Asiana) was in pieces, it's pretty astounding that the cabin crew even considered waiting for anything. I used to tell cabin crew, that as the pilots get to any accident first, it's quite likely that they will be in no state to control the evacuation. At the very least be prepared to get it going, but....

There was the Singapore Airlines ‘wing on fire’ landing, where the investigation found flight deck crew should have ideally used other means to assess damage rather than relying on a single outside source, which was the fire truck.

This is interesting and unusual. I remember at the time being surprised that they didn't shut the engine down in flight, and even more surprised that they then used it in reverse. Whilst the Captain was criticized for only using the single fire truck's assessment, it was from a fire truck, and not a random person on the radio. So, I can see why they didn't go in this case. The question I'd then ask is what would they have done if they'd simply exited the runway normally, and a random call from the radio had told them of the fire. Another aircraft would generally be the first person to see this sort of thing.

Then there is this one, where the flight deck drew were - allegedly - unaware of the fire. Or equally as bad, the smoke.

I fully understand the reasons why the flight deck is given the authority to order an evacuation… extent of the hazard, whether engines have been shut down, direction of the wind, and so on. But today, there are many very senior cabin crew on legacy airlines…inflight supervisors, pursers or cabin managers, that have vast experience of 20-30 years or more. Is it time to re-examine who can initiate an evacuation given the crew in the cabin are most likely to be aware of the situation and extent of the damage?

Some of the people you mention are excellent, and could be relied upon to make a good call. For instance the CSM from my QF30, probably would have knocked on the window from the outside to see how we were. And he would have had 390 odd people behind him. But, on average, I think they'd be inclined to jumping too soon. There are many reasons that they aren't pilots. And as mentioned by others, those legacy people are hated by management, and are replaced by kindergarten tots at every opportunity.

Engine shut-down is a major consideration. But with today’s electronics could there be a red warning lamp by the wing exits to indicate the engines are still running? Something similar maybe to the ‘cabin pressure’ warning lamp on Airbus aircraft.

A system that relies upon electricity and data from the engines. Much better to look at it. It's pretty obvious when they're running.

Or do we get more cameras - internally and externally - to assist the flight crew?

Again, reliant upon electricity, and continuity of circuits and integrity of the electronics bay(s).

Note that the camera feed from the tail that the pilots get is different to what goes to the cabin. The view is much wider, and encompasses all of the engines.

All three incidents above, with a minor exception for Asiana, resulted in the safe evacuation of passengers. But ‘what if’ there isn’t the same good luck in the next incident? We saw what can happen with the Saudia incident.

Saudia Flight 163 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Another to think about.

1985 Manchester Airport disaster - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[TheRealTMA]

Yes, nd what led to that error? Was it honestly just the error or deliberate wrong choice of an individual, or as suggested by the research and nicely summarised by @Quickstatus, what contributed to that error? Was it an impractical procedure leading to “everyone” taking short cut? Was it a particular view in some individuals/workteams that the rules did not apply to them, and why did they think that? Was it the case that everyone was doing it (whatever that was), so they thought it was OK? Did someone not understand something, but did not own that? Was it competing pressures meaning that in complying with one rule of procedure, the person necessarily defaulted on another? So many potential reasons for that point of human error.

edit: typos

We won't solve it on AFF, especially quoting sensational media sources. The final JTSB report will tell us, eventually.

 

[jb747]

Actually this discussion will be a success if those remaining people who plan on taking their luggage reconsider their ways!

 

[JohnM]

Actually this discussion will be a success if those remaining people who plan on taking their luggage reconsider their ways!

It is interesting that the JAL safety briefing video specifically shows not to take luggage. That seems unique, but something that perhaps should be mandatory for all airlines to include in some visual format (ie. apart from just saying it).

I think that there is something to be said, generally, for the animation-type safety briefing videos.

 

[LondonAussie]

It is interesting that the JAL safety briefing video specifically shows not to take luggage. That seems unique, but something that perhaps should be mandatory for all airlines to include in some visual format (ie. apart from just saying it).

I think that there is something to be said, generally, for the animation-type safety briefing videos.

I certainly remember hearing the phrase "taking nothing with you" from other airlines that I've flown recently, also to remove high heel shoes as they may tear the slide.

Have to admit I don't remember the videos, as many these days are trying to be more entertainment than safety messages (presumably a creative way to get people to watch them).

Though remember smaller short-haul flights often don't have safety videos, only audio and a manual demo from crew.

 

[jb747]

It is interesting that the JAL safety briefing video specifically shows not to take luggage. That seems unique, but something that perhaps should be mandatory for all airlines to include in some visual format (ie. apart from just saying it).

I think that there is something to be said, generally, for the animation-type safety briefing videos.

I think it's long past time for these videos to go back to what they were originally intended for, and stopped being some form of entertainment. They should start with something like "Listen to this, or you might die, or be responsible for the death of another." Quiz at the end, offload those who read their iPad through it.

 

[Pushka]

I think it's long past time for these videos to go back to what they were originally intended for, and stopped being some form of entertainment. They should start with something like "Listen to this, or you might die, or be responsible for the death of another." Quiz at the end, offload those who read their iPad through it.

We were saying this on our international flights just a day ago. They need to outline five? key points only.

 

[Himeno]

I think it's long past time for these videos to go back to what they were originally intended for, and stopped being some form of entertainment.

I've been saying that for years. Every airline, other the JL, that I've flown on over the past 20 years has been falling all over themselves trying to make the safety video "entertaining", which just defeats the point of the video.

In some cases, the shorter other language video has been more useful then the main video (such as the QF Japanese video is much more useful then the Qantas English video)

 

[Saab34]

I was about to say that, the evacuation part/leaving behind items should be included in all videos, or verbally advised in all briefings.

Cut the fluffy video stuff also. Amazed some regulatory bodies even permit half that stuff, most of it just airline marketing.

 

[Captain Halliday]

@jb747

I think it's long past time for these videos to go back to what they were originally intended for, and stopped being some form of entertainment. They should start with something like "Listen to this, or you might die, or be responsible for the death of another." Quiz at the end, offload those who read their iPad through it.

Could be some light loads.

And +1 about the videos going back to their intended purpose.

This nonsense on the current BA video is almost as bad as “double shot… mate”



The link between this influencer’s breakfast choices and passenger safety was never made.

 

[MEL_Traveller]

I've been saying that for years. Every airline, other the JL, that I've flown on over the past 20 years has been falling all over themselves trying to make the safety video "entertaining", which just defeats the point of the video.

In some cases, the shorter other language video has been more useful then the main video (such as the QF Japanese video is much more useful then the Qantas English video)

Part of the reason to make them ‘entertaining’ is to try and get people to watch. So a bit of a catch-22.

I still watch the full QF video because i like the content. Compare to a manual demo on VA which I admit that I can tune out of sometimes

Agree the use of electronic devices during the demo should be banned, and enforced. Ive seen QF crews do it, but VA completely ignores it.

 

[Quickstatus]

Ok so can anyone recite the Qantas safety briefing. Given that many here are high status passengers with lots of time in the cabin, one would think it would be easy..

@milehighclub put this in a thread 15years ago. No cheating and looking for the thread

also to remove high heel shoes as they may tear the slide.

I think the high heels tearing the slide is a myth.
It is also not in the Qantas safety briefing.... in fact shoes are not mentioned at all
And the FAA safety recomendations re evacuation puts removing high heel shoes after jumping feet first onto evacuations slide

 

[AIRwin]

And the FAA safety recomendations re evacuation puts removing high heel shoes after jumping feel first onto evacuations slide

Before or after?