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Back in 1991 there was an accident off the coast of East Sale with a RAAF 707 from 33 SQN Richmond getting itself into a VMCA loss of control scenario at too low an altitude to recover resulting in loss of five lives.
This was one of the worst days of my life as a professional pilot as I was sent to look for them and was first on the scene of that accident. 😭😢😭

Initially we were not even told what we were looking for however believed it was serious as on taxi we were told to change our callsign to Rescue 141.
 
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Interesting conversation..
Hard to imagine the middle ear and the brain coping with the input from an inverted spin.
Spinning a glider (even out of cloudbase.. ooops ) seems quite benign..
We were mostly auto tow launched and the spin recovery training was at 1000 ft or so… heaps of room….. ;)
 
Interesting conversation..
Hard to imagine the middle ear and the brain coping with the input from an inverted spin.
Spinning a glider (even out of cloudbase.. ooops ) seems quite benign..
We were mostly auto tow launched and the spin recovery training was at 1000 ft or so… heaps of room….. ;)
My ageing memory recalls that in the Macchi a solo student was required to eject at 10,000ft if they hadn't completed their spin/stall recovery. (3,000ft if dual)
 
My ageing memory recalls that in the Macchi a solo student was required to eject at 10,000ft if they hadn't completed their spin/stall recovery. (3,000ft if dual)
The only number I ever heard with regard to the Macchi was 10,000’ if out of control. Even the little jet could generate huge descent rates.

Students were permitted to do aeros down to about 5,000’ (and I think the 3,000’ was the instructor limit). Stall turns in a Macchi could quite easily convert themselves into spins (the inverted type), so it was quite possible that you could lose control of the aircraft in a stall turn, and immediately be in the ejection area. A student from a course a little ahead of us ejected from a stall turn that was done at about 7,000’, and only had a couple of swings in the chute. Who knows where he actually came out of the aircraft.

When I was doing the low level displays in the CT4, I had a practice manoeuvre that I used, simply to keep my own hand in. Basically a simultaneous slow roll, and steep (!) turn. So, instead of keeping the axis of the slow roll straight, it was a circle. I forget how many complete rolls it entailed, but as you can imagine it was a completely unbalanced manoeuvre. It could only be done to the left. On one occasion, the CO decided to come for a fly with me during one of the LL practices. As he was a C130 pilot, I’m not too sure what he thought about being upside down at a couple of hundred feet. Once we’d done the display sequence, he asked me about what we’d come to call the ‘rolling 360’, so we climbed up to a couple of thousand feet, and proceeded to do one. After about 270º, and whilst inverted, the engine coughed a couple of times, and died. So, pull the nose down a bit, roll out, and it restarted. The problem was that two up, it was taking longer than usual, so ultimately we ran the inverted fuel tank out of gas. His only comment “you’re mad”. But he didn’t stop me doing them.
 
One of the things that made the Macchi such a good trainer, was that whilst its behaviour was generally quite benign, it had the ability to demonstrate some aerodynamic quirks.

One of the lessons from aerodynamic classes was that a wing of more pronounced camber would generate more lift, but would stall at a lower angle of attack.

A manoeuvre that was taught on the course was the Derry turn. There’s a few variations on the theme, but basically you do (for instance) a steep turn to the right, but instead of rolling on lots of right bank, you roll to the left, through inverted, to the bank angle you want. So, if the turn needed 70º of right bank, you’d actually roll on 290º of left bank. As part of each student’s wings test, you work up an individual aeros display to show your testing officer. Your own instructor sees it, so there’s normally nothing new for the examiners. So, a certain bloggs discovered that if you really hooked into the roll input of a Derry turn (using full aileron and some rudder), and you then violently opposed the roll with full aileron, you could stall the aileron (cue the aero lesson above). The roll wouldn’t stop until the ailerons were centered. This was so consistent, that said bloggs incorporated it into his sequence, ensuring that it was done twice, once in each direction, just to show that it was intentional, not mishandling.

The same bloggs also discovered that you could do an inverted recovery from a stall turn (well, not all the way, but to about 30º nose low), and that too found its way into the sequence. 25 years later, the testing officer still remembered it.
 
One of the things that made the Macchi such a good trainer, was that whilst its behaviour was generally quite benign, it had the ability to demonstrate some aerodynamic quirks.
Talking to one of my neighbours the other day and was surprised to hear that in his opinion the Macchi was harder to fly on instruments that the other aircraft that he flew. This person on various postings was an instructor, flight commander and CO of No 2FTS and a highly experienced Sabre and Mirage pilot. (He retired as a Group Captain)

The PC-9 and the new PC-21 appear to be very placid by comparison.
 
Was originally scheduled on the Sunday 8th Sept QF25 744 service from SYD-HND. 8hrs before the scheduled departure at 2050 received the SMS to say the flight had been delayed to Monday 9th September at 1230.

The delay was due to Typhoon Faxai which made landfall near Chiba (close to Narita) at around 4:00am on Monday morning with more than 200 domestic and international flights cancelled to/from Narita and Haneda.

When we boarded the delayed service on Monday at around 1200 the Captain told us it was QF Operations that "in their wisdom" cancelled the flight. We didn't get away until 1320 due to the late arrival of passengers from a connecting flight.

QF reservations offered me to jump onto alternative flights including ANA which still departed Sydney Sunday evening 90 minutes later than scheduled bound for Tokyo. It was diverted to Nagoya (Chubu) Airport
- JAL departed Melbourne early Monday morning as scheduled and was delayed marginally arriving into Narita.

A couple of things flight related:

- in a case such as this it would appear QF Operations make the decision as opposed to the Captain? Would he / she have been consulted in the process
- Would the timing of the departure from Sydney (1230pm Monday) been more about maximising the time for the Typhoon to pass while also having the aircraft land in Haneda turned around and then return to Sydney as scheduled at 2200 as QF26

Something not directly related to the fight:

- the decision to delay rather than cancel I presume would be linked to compensation but with 8hrs notice before departure I'm assuming most passengers with connections onto QF25 would have been held back at their departure points rather than fly to Sydney and stay overnight. Without having all the dimensions of the decision making it appears the flight could have departed Sydney early on Monday morning arriving into Tokyo Monday afternoon - but this would have required connecting passengers to overnight in Sydney at, I presume, QF expense.
 
When we boarded the delayed service on Monday at around 1200 the Captain told us it was QF Operations that "in their wisdom" cancelled the flight. We didn't get away until 1320 due to the late arrival of passengers from a connecting flight.

The department that an outsider would call operations is the IOC (Integrated Operations Centre - which we had a number of cruel names for). Whilst they would have had to deal with the ramifications of the delay, they actually have zero aircraft knowledge. The actual decision would have been made by a smaller group that is led by the ‘Head of Flight Operations’ (deputy Chief Pilot). He personally, or whichever fleet manager was sitting in his chair, would have made the final decision. It would have been made by a pilot....who was basically saying he didn’t want his aircraft operating in the forecast conditions.

- in a case such as this it would appear QF Operations make the decision as opposed to the Captain? Would he / she have been consulted in the process

No.

- Would the timing of the departure from Sydney (1230pm Monday) been more about maximising the time for the Typhoon to pass while also having the aircraft land in Haneda turned around and then return to Sydney as scheduled at 2200 as QF26

Whilst there’s a window of times that would allow the 26 to return, fitting the various curfews, I’d expect the company to generally try for a reasonably early one. But, in this instance, as Haneda would have suffered numerous diversions, delays, and cancellations, I’d expect that the Japanese would have been issuing slots for arrivals, and you’d have to fit in with whatever they gave you.

- the decision to delay rather than cancel I presume would be linked to compensation but with 8hrs notice before departure I'm assuming most passengers with connections onto QF25 would have been held back at their departure points rather than fly to Sydney and stay overnight. Without having all the dimensions of the decision making it appears the flight could have departed Sydney early on Monday morning arriving into Tokyo Monday afternoon - but this would have required connecting passengers to overnight in Sydney at, I presume, QF expense.

That’s not a consideration that would have been made in the initial decision. The Head of Flight Ops is about the aircraft, NOT about the passengers, or commercial aspects. Commercial don’t get any say in what are safety decisions. IOC can clean that mess up later.
 
Is there very strong winds at higher altitudes today ?

Flew OOL-ADL today and cruised at FL240 the whole way. I assume that's lower than normal
 
Is there very strong winds at higher altitudes today ?

Flew OOL-ADL today and cruised at FL240 the whole way. I assume that's lower than normal

Absolutely. There’s a nice jet stream sitting over the southern states today. Associated turbulence at the higher levels also. Were you running late by any chance? Could be another reason.
 
Absolutely. There’s a nice jet stream sitting over the southern states today. Associated turbulence at the higher levels also. Were you running late by any chance? Could be another reason.

How high level? I just did a SYD-CBR and coming out of SYD we were really thrown around.
 
Yeah I just came back from MEL and there was forecast moderate turbulence at FL200 and below. We actually got it around the FL250 mark. But generally wasn’t too bad. Up high we were cruising at FL370 and was constant light turbulence. The jet was around FL340 with moderate turbulence indicated all the way up to FL420.
 
How answer to the daughter's question: "What will happen if all engines fail?"

Initially not a great deal. The aircraft is now a glider, and will travel about 3.5 nautical miles for every 1,000’ of altitude lost. If you can find a runway, or other suitable flat bit of terrain when you run out of altitude, you might even have a reasonable landing. Normal airliner descents are done at idle, so you’ve seen airliners gliding every time you’ve been on one.
 
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