Or if you thought you'd flicked different switches and had made an error?Poor CRM?
AFF Supporters can remove this and all advertisements
Yes, I didn’t mean that there’s a physical rod or hydraulic linkage going all the way to the engine. That’s impossible for high bypass engines anyway.Well, if they’re wired, there’s electricity involved. They aren’t soft touch software switches that the aircraft are so full of these days, but they are not a mechanical linkage to the EECs. They’re probably very simplistic, but there’s bound to be a small circuit board associated with them. Hopefully not one board for both.
Independently yes it absolutely is rapid. I’ll definitely time it next week, unless I’m on an older NG.It’s the selection of both from run to cutoff in under a second that seems a tad rapid. Next time you do a flight, trying timing it.
That’s my understanding as well. It makes for a quicker relight when the switch is in cutoff. But it needs to be intentional to shut it down so you need to lift it out and down.AV, have you been able to resolve the exact effect of the missing lockout that the Boeing bulletin was about. Seems to me that it removes the requirement to lift the switch, but can’t say for sure.
Is there an engine mode where everything in the engine resets to a "default" position when fuel switch is cutoff?when you toggle a switch to CUTOFF,
Not sure what you mean by mode. But when you move the switch to cutoff the fuel, bleed, start valves etc, all return to their “default” position.lol
Is there an engine mode where everything in the engine resets to a "default" position when fuel switch is cutoff?
Thanks . Thats what I meant. When restarting an engine, does performing a fuel cutoff then back to Run improve the probability of relighting the engine?But when you move the switch to cutoff the fuel, bleed, start valves etc, all return to their “default” position.
Though the startle effect can be very strongAnd if I did see him, it wouldn’t be followed by a question.
Are you able to provide a link to the copy of the report that you found?Found a copy of the report I could actually read. The flight prior had a message about stabilizer trim (STAB POS XCDR) which was apparently looked at and released by engineers. Any chance they received some kind of critical stabilizer trim alarm which triggered a memory item to cut out the stabilizer trim, but a brain fart meant they went for the wrong switches?
The report also contains what I was really curious about, which was the previous type ratings held by the flight crew. Of the various types and doing some Google searches of flight deck layouts, what stood out to me was the PA-34 rating held by the F/O.
Now, this is probably a total waste of time to think about, but the similarity between the engine cutoff switches in a B787 and the cowl flaps on a PA-34 struck me.
https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-boeing-787-dreamliner-coughpit-controls-30458013.html
Question is, could the F/O (who was, according to the report, pilot flying) have inadvertently activated the engine cut-off by memory, while thinking they were going for the cowl flap setting from a former type? Even so, why you would touch the cowl flaps on a climb, especially in hot weather as it was on the day. Additionally, based on his CPL date I assume it has been several years since he flew such a type.
Just thought I'd throw it out there.
If both hands were used then that would probably require the torso to rotate to get the left hand across far enough to do this - so shoulders would rotate and probably move upper body and head forward slightly and across towards the other pilot - I think it would be pretty hard for the pilot flying to miss this.The only way that I think I could move them in that time frame would be to use both hands, one for each switch. And even then I think it would take longer. Of course, I'm assuming the locking mechanism is functioning as I'm used to...
And doesn't normally happen to cylinders in other industries either - especially a failure of the base of the cylinder. Known causes of cylinder failures in the diving industry include -And again, the classic is the oxygen tank failure on QF30. Never happened before in aviation history, and yet, it still did.
You glance down and the switches are in cutoff. Based on the audio one pilot assumed the other did it. That was his immediate assumption. If this happened and the other pilot didn't wish others to know they had done it and knowing it was recorded they would have the response they didUnless I saw it happening, I don’t think I’d ever get to that conclusion. And if I did see him, it wouldn’t be followed by a question.
Nothings always as clear as it seems and some healthy debate is fine and informative. Many of us enjoy reading the thoughts of actual pilotsAnyway you guys keep debating it. It seems clear to me
At this stage I'm inclined to wait for the official reports or anything from verifiable sources …
I understand many airlines are starting to do this. Some are held back because of union pushback.You'd think that have a camera in the coughpit recording to the block box recorder would be something they would do these days.
Nothing? That's a stretchNothings always as clear as it seems and some healthy debate is fine and informative. Many of us enjoy reading the thoughts of actual pilots