I find it odd that fully trained pilots would hold the nose up for so long willingly unless they thought it needed it. As the report said that one of the pilots called out a change in flight law, I would assume they know the difference.
You aren't the only one who finds that odd. But, this quote, in reference to the person flying, and if it is accurate at all, might start to explain it.
'Baby' pilot at controls of doomed Air France Airbus | The Australian
“The European airlines select people with virtually no flight time at all and train them pretty much from the ground up,” he said.
“They are 'company babies' who rise up through the organisation. Whereas if you get your experience in the navy or air force, there's an emphasis on trial by fire.”
So, apparently, the aircraft was actually being flown, at least for much of the event, by the most junior of the pilots. More of less the equivalent of the 200 hour cadets that Jetstar thinks is such a good idea. He may have had more flight hours, but in all honesty, you do not learn how to fly in the coughpit of an airliner, nor in a simulator. You do learn how to manage systems, but, not how to fly.
As to why he was flying it, and not the other FO (i.e. the real one), it's very common in avaition to allow the most junior (in the seats) to fly during a problem, and the experienced pilot tries to work out what the aircraft systems are up to. Of course the implicit assumption in this is that a) that pilot actually knows how to fly, and won't make things worse (that was quite true until the advent of the most recent style of cadets), and b) the aircraft doesn't present immediate handling problems that need as much experience as possible applied to them. The upshot from that, is that you really should pick your mark, and have a plan for handling the 'who will fly/who will do the systems' question, based on the experience of the person you are sitting with. Contrary to what you may expect, if all other things are equal, the captain will generally let the FO fly, whilst he works with the systems, as it gives him a much better idea of just how to manage the problems. Flying with an SO on the other hand, requires more thought...something you do every time you meet a new crew member.
Do you think there might be of been problems with the control-stick or system behind it?
It looks to me like there were problems on both sides of the joystick.
If your question is, did the aircraft cause the accident, then I'd say the answer is no. It most certainly should not have had multiple airspeed indication failures...that's indicative of very poor design. But, loss of all airspeed data should not be hard to handle, much less lead to a crash. This has happened before though, a lot of times over the years (a 727 and a 757 come to mind...I think in those cases insects had blocked the probes). But, if the question is, did the aircraft make it hard, through confusing, and MOSTLY UNDOCUMENTED behaviour, then I'd have to say yes. They would have had multiple warnings, and probably not all immediately looked to be related. The ECAM would have been applying its priority logic to them, so it's quite possible that warnings appeared, stayed long enough to be half read, and then simply disappeared to be replaced by something else. Also possible that they flashed up long enough to distract, but without ever allowing them to be read.
But, ECAM would not have made the aircraft crash. It crashed because it was not being flown correctly. Problem is though, that in the modern world, quickly trained, minimally qualified (i.e. cheap) pilots, are part of a system that believes that the aircraft are 'uncrashable' as long as the pilots don't touch them. The entire Airbus philosophy is based upon the pilots fixing up the ECAM (i.e. systems), and letting ze computer fly the aircraft, as it knows best. The problem is that the computer gives up the ghost at the very slightest provocation, and when it does, it invariably drops an aircraft that is more difficult to fly into the pilots' laps. And, because of the changes to control laws, it may not even fly like it normally does.
As for why it stayed stalled...well firstly, I'm not convinced it would have been all that easy to unstall it, given the position of the tailplane. I don't know the A330, but in other Airbus types, the switch that moves it is inhibited (i.e. doesn't work) in flight, UNLESS the aircraft is in direct law, and there's no mention of that on the released info. There is a way of forcing the aircraft to direct law, but no mention of that here either. Nevertheless, even if it was having trouble overcoming the tail, you most certainly would have expected to seen full nose down joystick application. So why not? Well, what it appears happens is that as the airspeed indication slows, once it gets slow enough, the system rejects it. So what does that mean? Well, it means that it removes the information from the displays entirely...so even if correct, the pilots aren't shown this data. Secondly, though, the angle of attack system provides the stall warnings. And it does...until the AoA figure becomes so high, that the system does not believe that either, and rejects it too...and at that point the stall warnings cease, because the aircraft has rejected the data that says it is in one. So, pilot applies some forward stick, AoA reduces, and lo and behold, the stall warning starts again. He literally has to push through quite a period of warnings, before he would be able to get it to validly stop. And of course, he never did.
The pitch attitude, and performance tells you that you MUST be stalled, but the aircraft systems (and ze cannot be wrong) can't make up their mind.
Still want cadets in airliners?
(I would think the real risk is not getting is serviced by M'Benz the cause of a failure being the maintenance itself)
