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Apparently a somewhat contentious interim report has been pulled by the Koreans. The gist (supposedly), is that one engine had severe bird strike damage, but the other didn’t, and that this good one had been shut down in error. That does go against official reports from way back to the effect...

Jumping to a conclusion there. All that means is that he’s on a staff ticket, and if cabin crew were seated further forward, it means that they were on duty tickets.

Just a question out of curiousity... Does this mean that you're showing them an unlocked phone?

Duty period before departure from Singapore. Plus flight time to Melbourne. Duty period on ground in Melbourne. Flight time to Sydney. Duty period after landing. It would be more than 8 or 9 hours, and probably limiting if a 2 man crew. Assuming they actually diverted and that it wasn’t a charter.

The surcharge will disappear, but the stores will still add the 'cost' into whatever they charge.

The conditions in Hobart (or Melbourne) aren't anywhere like Europe or Canada. There, the de-icing is done with passengers on board, because the "holdover time" (basically how long it lasts before you have to start again) can be quite short. But here, it will last long enough that in many, and...

Disconnected autopilot, and didn’t crash? Impressive.

If the airline uses multiple FOs or SOs instead of multiple Captains for long haul ops, then the FO being left in charge will require an ATPL.

Airbus is more or less the same. Which is why the power off condition is to either run, or no change. It always looked normal, until around the point where the gear would be selected. Nobody jumped to 'start levers/fuel switches', because it made zero sense. I expect that there are numerous...

Because you could need to shut the engine down with the throttle jammed or non responsive. Thinking about it, it would also add either a mechanical interlock, or some form of software, so adding complexity and avenues of failure for a system that is intentionally isolated. In other words, it...

I suspect that they weren’t testing for the lock’s presence, and were using the normal “lift and move” action, without realising that the “lift” wasn’t necessary.

I recall that 330 incident. It was pretty famous around the company at the time. If I recall correctly, the door had been closed and bridge moved back, and for whatever reason the bridge operator moved it back, and the CSM opened the door, without talking to the coughpit. Bridges should be in a...

I'm sure that will come out eventually, but it's a really good question.

From reaching a stable idle, probably about 10 seconds. But the aircraft would be deeply on the wrong side of the angle of attack by that point (too slow), so one engine may not have had enough power. The obvious one, I think.

Flight time limitations vary with all sorts of factors, so you can't just give a one size fits all answer. The A380 mostly flew with a 4 man crew, and that has different limits to a 3 man or 2 man. In this instance, I'd expect it to be 3 man, so, probably 12 hours extendable to 14.

Nowhere near. The gear handle in on the front panel, slightly on the FO’s side of centre. The fuel control switches are on the centre pedestal, aft of the thrust levers. There’s always some form of lock on the landing gear handle. It unlocks when the air/ground logic changes. There is a way of...

I would assume that the air/ground logic comes into play here.

Given that we now know that the aircraft was being flown by the FO, it seems likely that the phantom switch flicker is the captain. The conversation then makes sense. The gear lever is still down, so it also seems that the gear was never selected up. It looks like the switches were moved at the...

Yes. I particular it moves the inlet guide vanes to a position that may make a start more likely. Ignition will be reactivated automatically. Not really. People don’t wave their hands around for pretty obvious reasons. I used to sit my hands on my legs, when supporting. When flying, I generally...

AV, have you been able to resolve the exact effect of the missing lockout that the Boeing bulletin was about. Seems to me that it removes the requirement to lift the switch, but can’t say for sure.